South Korea will soon launch a set of postage stamps showcasing the ROKS Dosan Ahn Chang-ho submarine, the first time a domestically built submarine will be featured in the country’s stamp collection.
According to South Korean news agency Yonhap, the stamps will be available for purchase starting February 20.
The ROKS Dosan Ahn Chang-ho is the lead vessel of South Korea’s KSS-III Batch-1 class, a fleet of 3,000-ton submarines developed with advanced homegrown technologies.
The submarine, delivered to the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) in 2021, enhances the country’s underwater defense posture against North Korean threats.
The second boat, ROKS Ahn Mu, entered service in 2023, while the third and final vessel in the class, ROKS Shin Chae-ho, was handed over last year.
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All three submarines hold significant strategic value in South Korea’s defense framework, representing the country’s largest and most advanced submarine class to date.
Their design is based on South Korea’s previous two submarine classes—the Jang Bogo and Son Won-Il—which are localized versions of Germany’s Type 209 and Type 214 diesel-electric attack submarines.
South Korea has outlined plans to build nine Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarines (SSBs) in three batches of three boats each.
With the first batch already completed and delivered, the country has moved on to the next phase. In March 2023, the keel was laid for the first of three extended KSS-III Batch 2 submarines.
The KSS-III Batch 1 submarines are crewed by 50 personnel and have a displacement of 3,358 tons when surfaced and 3,705 tons when submerged. They measure 274 feet in length, with a beam of 31.5 feet.
Like their predecessors in the KSS-II class, these submarines are powered by diesel-electric propulsion with an Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) system that utilizes fuel cell technology.
This enables them to achieve speeds of up to 20 knots and sustain underwater operations for as long as 20 days without surfacing.
On the other hand, the Batch 2 submarines will retain the same crew capacity but will be approximately 20 feet longer than their Batch 1 counterparts. The final variants are expected to be even larger and more sophisticated.
Submarines In Korean Waters
By honoring its domestically built submarine, Seoul underscores the growing weight of these vessels in strengthening the nation’s defense strategy.
However, this emphasis on submarine capabilities is not unique to South Korea; North Korea also considers its submarine fleet a cornerstone of its military preparedness against the South.
In fact, Pyongyang’s extensive use of submarines, especially for covert operations, has repeatedly triggered tensions and security crises on the Korean Peninsula since the 1953 armistice.
One of the most infamous North Korean espionage operations took place in September 1996, when a spy submarine ran into trouble off the coast of South Korea and triggered a violent and prolonged manhunt.
What began as a covert intelligence mission quickly spiraled into a deadly confrontation. On September 14, 1996, a North Korean Sang-O (“Shark”) class submarine set sail from Toejo Dong under the command of Captain Chong Yong-ku.
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Typically operated by a 15-person crew, the vessel was carrying additional personnel: three elite special forces operatives from the Reconnaissance Bureau and Colonel Kim Dong-won, a high-ranking intelligence officer.
Their mission was to gather intelligence on South Korean military installations in Gangneung, roughly 90 miles south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
At the time, North Korea was facing a catastrophic famine, which, in turn, fueled Pyongyang’s paranoia that South Korea might exploit the crisis.
The submarine crew was under strict orders to complete their mission at any cost, with no option of returning home in failure. This type of covert operation was not new. North Korean operatives had frequently infiltrated South Korea for sabotage and espionage.
The submarine arrived near Gangneung on September 15 and deployed its infiltration team under the cover of darkness. The special forces operatives swam ashore while the submarine continued to capture reconnaissance photos along the coastline.
When the vessel returned to extract the team on September 16, the spies were nowhere to be found. However, during the second attempt to recover them on September 17, the submarine ran aground on a reef just 20 meters from An-in Beach.
Even after desperate efforts to dislodge the vessel, it remained stuck. Then, Captain Chong ordered the crew to abandon the ship at midnight and set fire to the submarine’s interior before evacuating.
At approximately 1:30 a.m. on September 18, a passing taxi driver noticed the stranded submarine and a group of men gathering on the shore. He immediately reported the sighting to the South Korean military. This forced the local authorities to place the entire Kangwon Province on high alert.
By morning, thousands of South Korean troops, backed by helicopters and tracking dogs, were mobilized to hunt down the missing crew. The Republic of Korea Navy also deployed vessels to secure the coastline in case additional North Korean submarines were present.
Later that afternoon, a local farmer spotted a suspicious individual in his fields. South Korean soldiers quickly moved in and captured the man, Lee Kwang-soo, the submarine’s helmsman.
Under interrogation, Lee initially claimed that the submarine had drifted into South Korean waters due to engine failure during a training exercise. However, after further questioning, he confessed that the crew had been engaged in an espionage mission.
Shortly after Lee’s capture, South Korean troops made a chilling discovery on a nearby mountain: ten dead bodies, including Captain Chong and other members of the crew, all executed with gunshots to the head.
Another body, identified as Colonel Kim, was found separately. It appeared that the North Korean operatives had carried out summary executions of their own comrades to prevent them from being captured alive.
Lee further revealed that the submarine had originally carried 26 personnel, meaning that 14 operatives were still unaccounted for. This sparked a large-scale manhunt across the rugged terrain of Gangwon Province.
Over the next several weeks, South Korean troops engaged in multiple firefights with the dispersed North Korean operatives. By the end of September, 11 infiltrators had been killed, some in direct confrontations and others in apparent suicides to avoid capture.
The North Koreans also killed a South Korean police officer. Despite the heavy losses, three elite Reconnaissance Bureau operatives remained at large.
South Korea’s President Kim Young-sam issued a stern warning on September 20, threatening retaliatory action if further provocations occurred. Pyongyang, in turn, insisted that the submarine had merely suffered mechanical failure and had unintentionally entered South Korean waters.
However, tensions escalated when a South Korean consular officer, Choe Deok-geun, was assassinated in Vladivostok on October 1. The method used, a poison similar to one found aboard the captured submarine, suggested North Korea’s involvement in revenge for its fallen operatives.
On November 4, nearly two months after the incident began, two surviving North Korean operatives were spotted near Inje, just 12 miles from the border.
A fierce gun battle ensued, leaving three South Korean soldiers dead before the infiltrators were finally killed. A diary recovered from their bodies detailed their brutal journey across nearly 80 miles of South Korean territory.
The 49-day operation resulted in 12 South Korean deaths and the elimination of 24 North Korean operatives. Only two infiltrators survived: Lee Kwang-soo, who was captured, and Li Chul-jin, who is believed to have escaped. The manhunt cost South Korea an estimated 200 billion won (US$187 million).
In a rare move, North Korea later issued a statement of regret on December 29. The following day, Seoul returned the cremated remains of the 24 deceased North Korean operatives.
Yet, Pyongyang’s covert operations continued unabated. Just a year and a half later, another North Korean spy submarine met a similarly disastrous fate near Sokcho.
In June 1998, a North Korean Yugo-class submarine was caught in a fishing net near the South Korean port of Sokcho. As the vessel was being towed back to port, all crew members were found dead in what appeared to be a murder-suicide.
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