Russia will soon join the ranks of the US and China by having its first naval base in Africa. This base will give Russia a naval presence in the world’s strategically important waterways—the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Sudan is situated at a critical junction, bordering Egypt and Libya in North Africa, Ethiopia and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa, South Sudan in East Africa, and Chad and the Central African Republic in Central Africa. The Red Sea is strategically important as 12 percent of global trade passes through it, and the presence of the Suez Canal at its northern end.
The base in Sudan will help Russia compensate for losing its naval base in Tartus, Syria. With the instability in Syria, having a stable base in Sudan ensures that Russia maintains a strategic foothold in the region.
Sudan’s foreign minister confirmed the plan to proceed after years of delay. The announcement came during the minister’s visit to Moscow, where he met his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov. After their meeting, Sharif said the two countries were in “complete agreement” on establishing a Russian base, “and there are no obstacles.”
The proposal was first suggested by then-President Omar al-Bashir in 2017 during a trip to Sochi. However, he was ousted in a coup in 2019, derailing Russia’s plan to get a military presence in the region. A deal was finalized in 2020 that allowed Russia to keep up to four naval warships, including nuclear-powered ones, in Sudan for 25 years.
The draft agreement submitted by Russia in 2020 emphasized that the Russian Navy’s logistics facility in Sudan is defensive and is aimed at maintaining peace and stability in the region. The draft said the base “is defensive and is not aimed against other countries.”
The naval logistics base can be used for the repair of Russian warships and for replenishing supplies of its warships. The Russian Navy’s logistics base in Sudan is expected to include the coastal, water, and mooring areas.
The deal kept hanging fire due to differences the two sides had over the terms and conditions of the deal. Then the civil war started in Sudan in April 2023 between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and threw the spanner in Russia’s plan to have military footing in the region.
The Russian-backed Wagner group supported the paramilitary forces, whereas the Kremlin backed the Sudanese military. Russia accounted for about 87 percent of the country’s armament, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
In April 2024, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov visited Sudan and pledged unbridled support for its army. Russia has also backed Sudan at the UN Security Council, vetoing a resolution calling for a ceasefire for humanitarian reasons.
Options for Russia after shutting down of Tartus naval base in Syria
Syria’s new government terminated a treaty granting Russia a long-term military presence in the Mediterranean, a deal brokered under now-ousted leader Bashar al-Assad.
The agreement, signed in 2017, extended the Russian Navy’s lease on the port of Tartus for 49 years. However, its future became uncertain after Assad was overthrown by Islamist rebels at the end of 2024.
The de facto authorities in Tartus annulled the agreement and forced the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces. It was a blow to Russia as it was the country’s only refueling station in the Mediterranean Sea.
The Tartus base was strategically important for Russia, especially considering the limitations faced by its Black Sea fleet, which cannot pass through the Bosphorus due to the ongoing war with Ukraine.
After it lost the Tartus base, Russia operated multiple flights to and from an airbase in eastern Libya, suggesting a shift from the Syrian bases that have served as a hub for its military operations in Africa and the Mediterranean region.
Tartus was a poor substitute for the Soviet Navy’s earlier excess to Egypt’s bigger harbors. But, as Russia had no aspirations to fight a war in the Mediterranean, it did not need to maintain a bigger force.
At a given point, the Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean was not more than 11 vessels, including 3–5 auxiliaries. It was enough for deterrent signaling, intelligence gathering, interventions in smaller-scale conflicts, and posturing to support its allies. In recent times, it has facilitated the export of Iranian oil to Syria and conducted Kalibr strikes in support of the Assad regime.
Despite its limited role, the loss of Tartus comes with its ramifications. The base had allowed Russia to refuel and restock ships, and it also served as a vital maintenance hub for the area.
This explains why Russian ships like Admiral Grigorevich have been allowed to stay in the area for extended periods without returning to their home ports. The Mediterranean fleet’s connection to the Black Sea Fleet was severed by the closure of the Turkish straits following the Ukraine war.
In such a scenario, Port Sudan offers facilities that could support a modest Russian presence in the Red Sea.
Russia’s Foreign Military Bases
Soviet naval bases existed for most of the Cold War in Cuba, Syria, and Vietnam. The Soviet Navy also had basing agreements with Albania from 1955-1962, Egypt from 1967-1972, Somalia from 1964-1978, and Ethiopia from 1977-1991.
Several other countries had port access agreements with the Soviet Union, but these did not amount to full-fledged military bases.
Soviet air bases at various points included facilities in Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen, Cuba, Guinea, Angola, and Vietnam. Soviet forces were withdrawn from all of its bases outside Cold War-era Soviet boundaries between 1989 and 1994.
When compared to its arch-rival, Russia does not have very many military bases abroad. The United States has over 700 military facilities outside its borders, while Russia has less than 20 such facilities.
Apart from bases in the countries that were carved out of the erstwhile USSR, Russia has been expanding its footprint in the Middle East and North Africa.
Since the start of its intervention in Syria in 2015, Russia has established a number of facilities in Syria, most notably the naval facility in Tartus and the Khmeimim Air Base. The smaller air bases Tiyas and Shayrat also host Russian aircraft and support personnel.
Russia’s military expansion abroad pales in from the United States’ military presence. However, in comparison to other powers like China, it is relatively extensive.
The United States maintains a permanent base in Djibouti, an Air Force facility in Niger, and troops in Kenya and Somalia, and it has authorized special operations forces to support counterterrorism missions in other Sub-Saharan African countries. It also provides logistical support to French counterterrorism operations in Mali.
In terms of capacity, China has only one base, located in Djibouti. However, the US government suspects it is pursuing other bases in multiple countries, including Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Namibia, the Seychelles, and Tanzania.
There have been reports that Moscow has entered an agreement to change existing training and assistance ties with a number of African states into permanent bases. The six countries are the Central African Republic (CAR), Egypt, Eritrea, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Sudan.
Russia has preferred access to the countries over permanent bases as it is fraught with risks of getting embroiled in the security issues of the host states and requires significantly more investment.
The naval sector is the lone exception to this general rule against setting up overseas bases.
Russia (and the Soviet Union before it) has long sought guaranteed port access for its naval vessels worldwide due to the nature of naval operations and their requirements for resupply and repair.
However, this is inadequate in high-priority regions, such as the Mediterranean, where the Russian Navy conducts frequent patrols. Real bases are needed to sustain the Mediterranean military presence.
