The commander of US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has raised concerns about the increasing number of drones flying over American military installations and suggested that some may be engaged in espionage.
Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 13, US Air Force Gen. Gregory M. Guillot stressed the need for expanded authority to counter these aerial incursions.
He stated that the primary threat posed by these drones is their ability to detect and conduct surveillance on sensitive military capabilities.
Guillot was responding to a question about drone activity over US bases, including Langley Air Force Base, which experienced multiple incursions in 2023. However, he did not specify the operators behind the drones.
Unmanned aerial vehicles were reported over multiple locations across the US last year, with New Jersey experiencing a particularly high number of sightings.
These drones were also observed over key military installations, including Joint Base Langley, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, and Vandenberg Space Force Base.
During the Senate hearing, Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) pressed Gen. Gregory M. Guillot on the potential dangers these drone incursions pose to military operations, infrastructure, and personnel.
“Senator, the primary threat I see for them in the way they’ve been operating is detection and perhaps surveillance of sensitive capabilities on our installations,” Guillot said.
He added, “There were 350 detections reported last year on military installations, and that was 350 over a total of 100 different installations of all types and levels of security.”
Last month, U.S. Sen. Mark Kelly (D-AZ) suggested to reporters that foreign adversaries are likely behind some of these drone incursions. He added that it just makes sense for them to engage in such activities.
Drawing from his own experience, Kelly recalled his time at the Pax River Test Center, where North Korean operatives were once observed monitoring the facility from outside its perimeter.
He explained that if someone wanted better video footage of a military installation, a drone flying overhead would provide a much clearer view than standing at the fence.
Gaps In US Military Drone Defense
While commanders at highly sensitive locations, such as nuclear bases, have the authority to defend their airspace against drone incursions, many US military installations remain vulnerable due to inadequate counter-drone capabilities.
This gap in defense has raised alarm among lawmakers, with Sen. Tom Cotton expressing disbelief that only half of US bases are authorized to respond to drone threats.
Currently, military installations within the US are primarily limited to electronic countermeasures that focus on detecting unauthorized drones rather than actively neutralizing them.
More advanced defensive systems, including directed energy weapons and kinetic countermeasures, are not permitted for domestic use, leaving installations exposed to potential surveillance and attacks.
Concerns over drone threats extend beyond military bases. Cotton highlighted reports that just last week, Mexican cartels were allegedly authorized to deploy drones armed with explosives against US Border Patrol agents.
He questioned whether the Department of Defense required additional authorization to share drone-related intelligence with the Department of Homeland Security and other border security agencies.
Guillot confirmed that such authorization was necessary, emphasizing the need for seamless data-sharing between government entities to address drone threats effectively.
Guillot has strongly advocated for expanding military authority in countering drones, particularly in securing bases and enhancing collaboration with other agencies.
He called for a broader application of US Code 10 USC 130i, which currently governs the military’s ability to protect certain facilities from unmanned aircraft.
Under this law, the military is permitted to disrupt, disable, or destroy unauthorized drones using electronic interference or reasonable force. However, Guillot argued that its scope is too limited, covering only select installations rather than all military bases.
In addition to expanding 130i’s coverage to all military installations, Guillot urged lawmakers to extend the permitted range for counter-drone measures beyond the immediate vicinity of a base.
He warned that many drones can surveil installations from outside their perimeters using side-looking or slant-range sensors, yet current regulations prevent military personnel from taking action until the drone crosses into restricted airspace.
Meanwhile, the Defense Department is actively working to enhance its counter-drone capabilities. Northcom and NORAD have reallocated resources and personnel to establish a dedicated counter-drone operations branch within their headquarters.
Late last year, Pentagon leadership assigned Northcom the role of “synchronizer, integrator, and coordinator” for counter-small unmanned aerial system (UAS) activities across the continental United States and Alaska, Guillot stated in his written testimony.
Additionally, collaboration with interagency and industry partners, along with updates to policies and legal frameworks, will be necessary to balance security, privacy, and defense priorities.
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