In his solemn address to France and the European Union, French President Emmanuel Macron warned in an apocalyptic tone that “Russia has become, today and for a long time, a threat to France and to Europe,” and questioned whether Vladimir Putin will end his campaign of conquests in Ukraine.
Simultaneously, an economically struggling European Union is gearing up to raise US$867 billion to “re-arm” Europe and fight it out with Moscow.
Vice-President of the European Commission Kaja Kallas believes that the war in Ukraine must end with the “defeat of Russia, the disintegration of the country and its division into smaller states.”
Meanwhile, the Polish prime minister Donald Tusk has announced that his government is preparing to require every adult male to undergo “large-scale military training” to more than double the army’s size.
Notably, this rabid ‘war-rhetoric’ is coming out of Europe at a time when the US, historically Moscow’s main adversary, is attempting peace-talks with Russia to end the three-year-old Ukraine war and accommodate Russia back into the international system by easing the all-pervasive economic sanctions on Moscow.
All this ‘war rhetoric’ is coming out of Europe when Putin has repeatedly clarified that he has no desire to attack Europe and many geopolitical analysts have explained that Russia simply does not have the required numbers or resources for a military campaign beyond Ukraine.
John J. Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, has argued that Russia’s invading army in 2022 had 190,000 soldiers, too small a force to invade and occupy a large country like Ukraine with a population of over 40 million. He cites the example that Nazi German required 1.5 million troops to invade Poland, thus Putin would need at least 2 million troops if he wanted to conquer all of Ukraine.
“In short, Russia did not have the capability to subdue all of Ukraine, much less conquer other countries in Eastern Europe,” Mearsheimer said in his lecture delivered at Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute in Florence, Italy on June 16, 2022.
While one can debate the actual numbers required for an invasion of Europe in the age of technology, there is no denying the fact that Russia, with all its might, has been able to occupy just around 20 percent of Ukrainian territory after three years of war. That also, when many of these areas have been historically Russian-speaking and populated by a majority of ethnic Russians—in other words, a population somewhat sympathetic to Russia’s cause.
Russia’s inability to subdue even half of Ukraine is a good indication that Moscow is in no position to harbor imperialistic designs over whole of Europe, or Eastern Europe, or even the former Soviet republics.
This makes one question the motives behind European leaders’ scaremongering. Could it be that Russia’s assertiveness in Ukraine and Putin’s open disregard for a world order sanctified by West European powers have brought to the forefront the latent but centuries-old feelings of insecurity vis-à-vis a Russia that is refusing to accept sovereign inequality in its relationship to Europe?
The Historical Roots Of Russophobia In Europe
Geographically, Russia is in a peculiar position. In Asia, Russia has always been considered a European power, whereas in Europe, Russia has always been considered an Asian power on the doorsteps of Europe, much like Turkey. Ideologically, for the East, Russia has always been a Western power, but for the West, Russia has always been dangerously Oriental.
Norwegian political scientist and professor at the University of South-Eastern Norway, Glenn Deisen writes that for almost 500 years, in Europe relations with Russia have been “juxtaposed as Western versus Eastern, European versus Asiatic, civilization versus barbarism, modern versus backward, developed versus underdeveloped, liberal versus despotic, Enlightened versus superstitious, free versus enslaved, progressive versus stagnant, good versus evil, open society versus closed society, and the free world versus the authoritarian world.”
Before liberal democracy became prevalent in Western Europe, the ideological divide between Western Europe and Russia was defined as the chasm between ‘Enlightened Despotism’ versus ‘Barbarian Despotism.’ After the industrial revolution that started in Manchester, England, in the 1760s and spread through Western Europe within the next half century, this divide with Russia was defined in terms of Industrial versus Agrarian, Modern versus Backward, Scientific versus Irrational.
As liberal democracy took hold in European countries, the divide became between Democratic and Totalitarian. After the Russian Revolution in 1917, new terminology of Capitalism versus Communism defined the relations between the West and Russia.
During the Cold War, the nomenclature of Free versus Enslaved, Open versus Closed and Christianity versus Atheism were adopted. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the ‘End of History’ and the End of Ideological battles, but it was not long before a new binary division of Liberal Democracy versus Authoritarianism was resurrected.
Throughout this 500-year history, Russia’s otherness has been central to the West’s self-image. Russia was viewed with not only disdain but also as an imminent threat to European Civilization. This mutually antagonistic binary has given Russia two options: One, Russia can accept its inferior position vis-à-vis the West, accept the West’s inherent superiority, and follow the lead of the West as a faithful student. Second, Russia can continue to remain uncivilized/underdeveloped/backward/autocratic, and remain a menacing power, a threat to European civilization which must be subdued or contained.
This attitude of the West toward Russia was succinctly expressed by former Prime Minister of Lithuania, Andrius Kubilius when he argued in 2021 that “the new EU strategy towards Russia should entail three elements—deterrence, containment and transformation.” Russia must be contained and transformed.
Holy Roman Empire To Liberalism – The West’s Civilizational Mission
In his seminal 1978 book Orientalism, Palestinian-American author Edward Said illustrated how the West has always portrayed the East in a contemptuous and problematic way. According to Said, the Orient is defined as the other of the West. He analyzed how Western experts, or Orientalists, have created a view of the East based on essentialist assumptions of Western superiority.
This self-image of the West, as superior, more civilized and enlightened, more progressive and rational, can be discerned as far as ancient Greeks who fought with despotic Persians. This civilizing mantle was then passed to the Holy Roman Empire, which fought with the barbaric Huns.
According to this view, as the Holy Roman Empire heroically defended Western civilization from the barbaric Huns, the Kievan Rus fell to the Mongols in the 13th century, breaking it from the embrace of Western Civilization. The Mongols ruled Russia for the next 250 years, permanently giving the Russians an Asian tinge in terms of race, geography, and culture.
As Russians overthrew Mongols, defeated the Tatar kingdoms in the 15th and 16th centuries, and gradually expanded into Eastern Europe in the 17th century, the West became increasingly nervous of an expanding Russia, which was still an Asiatic power in the eyes of civilized Europe.
In the 18th century, French philosopher Voltaire even compared the struggle between France and Russia as a rivalry between the Athenians and the Scythians some 2,000 years ago.
Barbarian Hordes At The Gates Of Civilized Europe
Barbarian hordes at the gates of civilized Europe is an often repeated trope that has been utilized to forge western unity at least since the last four centuries.
Incidentally, the scaremongering of European leaders from French President Macron to Polish PM Tusk about an imminent continent-wide European invasion by Putin has striking parallels in history.
In 1797, Polish general Micheal Sokolnicki presented to the French foreign ministry a “fake testament” of Peter the Great, which aimed to convince the French that a Russian attack was imminent and that Poland’s and Europe’s fates were inseparable, much like Ukraine’s contention in the 21st century that Ukraine’s fate is intricately linked to Europe’s fate.
The fake testament of Peter the Great read: “Hold the state in a system of continual warfare, in order to maintain strict discipline among the soldiers and in order to keep the nation on the move and ready to march at the first sign… All of these divisions will then provide total latitude for the soldiers of the front lines, so that they may with vigor and all possible certitude conquer and subjugate to the rest of Europe.”
However, Peter the Great had no such plans, and the testament was forged by Poland.
In his paper, ‘President Truman and Peter the Great’s Will,’ American historian J G Clifford talks about how this fake testament by Peter the Great was used by Napoleon when he invaded Russia in 1812. The testament emerged again as propaganda against Russia during the French-British invasion of Crimea in 1853–1856. In the 20th century, even US President Harry Truman used the forged testament to explain Soviet foreign policy and to inform how the West should respond.
Similarly, it seems that despite repeated denials by Russia, and despite geopolitical experts explaining that Russia is in no position to expand the Ukraine War to Europe, European leaders keep talking about an imminent Russian invasion to justify their own call to scuttle peace initiatives by the US in Ukraine.
In this sense, G E Wheeler, an English historian, in his paper ‘Russophobia in the western world: A brief case history,’ defined Russophobia as an “intermittent state of mind attributing to Russia designs and capabilities which, if unchecked, could result in her strategic, economic, and eventually ideological domination of the greater part of the civilized world.”
From ‘Crimean War’ To ‘Ukraine War’ – West’s Russia Containment Strategy
The ongoing Ukraine war started in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea, followed by a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. After three years of protracted war, Europe is standing at a crossroads today. While the US is leading negotiations with both Russia and Ukraine to reach a ceasefire, European countries do not seem ready for peace. They are preparing for pushing the whole continent into war against Russia.
Leading this push for war are France and the UK, who have also shown their willingness to send their troops and fighter jets to Ukraine as a security guarantee for Kyiv.
Earlier this month, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer confirmed that he is “ready to put boots on the ground and planes in the air” to support a peace deal for the war-torn country.
Meanwhile, French President Macron said in a televised address on March 5 that he plans to meet with army chiefs from European countries willing to send troops to Ukraine after any eventual peace deal with Russia.
Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen went as far as saying that “peace in Ukraine may be more dangerous than ongoing war.”
Indeed, even Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has shown willingness to join the peacekeeping force in Ukraine.
It looks like European leaders, led by France and the UK, are ready to push the whole of Europe into war to contain a resurgent Russia. This European determination to contain Russia at all costs, even when Russia has not threatened them directly in any way, also has striking parallels in history. Another three-year war that started in Crimea and ended up becoming a war of international European alliance against solitary Russia.
Known as the Crimean War (1853-1856), it started between Russia and the Ottoman Empire over what many would say were Russian attempts to reassert control over historical Russian lands in Crimea. However, soon, France, the UK, and some principalities of Italy were all fighting on the side of the Ottomans against Russia.
Russia had not threatened the UK and France, or their colonies in Asia and Africa in any way. However, the fear of a resurgent Russia was enough to make them jump into war against a fellow Christian power while supporting the Muslim Ottomans.
In 1853, just like now in 2025, it was of no consequence whether Russia had directly threatened Western Europe. The real motive for France and the UK is that Russia must be contained, or it will come too close to Europe.
Russia’s decoupling From Europe Under Putin
Russia’s history, especially its relationship with Europe, has mirrored a pendulum for the last three centuries. It swings between two extremes: a deep desire to form an alliance with Europe, followed by a recognition that Europe would never accept it on equal terms, and consequently a strong determination to wean off ‘corrupting’ Western/liberal influences and develop along Russia’s own genesis.
The process started in the late 17th century with Peter the Great’s accession to the throne (ruled 1682-1725). Inspired by his time abroad in Western Europe, Peter made huge efforts to modernize Russia, most famously building Saint Petersburg as Russia’s “window to Europe.”
During his reign, Peter the Great implemented sweeping political, military, and social reforms aimed at Westernizing Russia. He reorganized the Russian army along modern lines and dreamed of making Russia a maritime power. He also commanded all his courtiers and officials to wear European clothing and cut off their long beards, causing great upset among boyars, the feudal elites of Russia’s agrarian society.
Through a decree issued in December 1699, Peter the Great shifted the celebration of the New Year in Russia from September 1st to January 1st, aligning it with the Christian era and European practices.
However, at the turn of the 19th century, Alexander I became the Tsar, who reversed this trend toward Westernization. Alexander I was a Russian nationalist who wanted Russia to develop based on Russian culture rather than European culture.
He was deeply influenced by the 19th-century Slavophilia movement in Russia, an intellectual movement that wanted the Russian empire to be developed based on values and institutions derived from Russia’s early history and opposed the influences of Western Europe in Russia.
Russia has witnessed a somewhat similar trajectory in transitioning from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin tried to integrate Russia into the Western market economy. Yeltsin eliminated most price controls, privatized many major state assets, allowed for private property ownership, and embraced free market principles. Under his watch, a stock exchange, commodities exchanges, and private banks all came into being.
He allowed a comparatively free press and Western popular culture to seep into Russia. However, Yeltsin was followed by Putin, who from the beginning had no illusions about the West. Putin placed more emphasis on BRICS, which was formalized in 2009.
With the Ukraine war, Russia’s break from the West seems complete. Russia was kicked out of the G8. The West imposed a slew of sanctions on Moscow, and trade relations and direct flights have ended. Putin has also decoupled Russian energy from Europe by diverting it to Asian countries. He has signed new security treaties with China, North Korea, and Iran.
As Russia weans itself off Europe by aligning with Asia and Europe prepares for a final showdown with Moscow, the bleak future looks like a prisoner of the past.
- Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK. He is interested in studying Geopolitics from a historical perspective.
- He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com
