As the grinding Ukraine war achieves another grim milestone of completing 1000 days, military planners worldwide are taking notes and adopting their battle strategies accordingly.
This war has broken many myths about 21st-century warfare, like the misplaced belief that trench warfare and heavy artillery are things of the past, infantry will play no role in modern war, MIRV Ballistic missiles are only for deterrence, and wars stretching years and fought along hundreds of miles-long frontlines are unthinkable.
These are just some of the doctrines that were touted as gospel truths about the Art of Modern Warfare but now appear outdated. This war has pushed into oblivion weapon systems believed to be crucial for a swift victory and heralded the arrival of new low-cost technologies that will dominate warfare in this century.
The Russia-Ukraine war, variously described as a ‘War of Attrition’ and ‘A Meat-Grinder,’ is also unique in many ways, qualitatively different from the wars we have gotten used to in the twenty-first century.
Most of the wars fought in this century, indeed during the last more than three decades, were essentially asymmetric wars fought between two supremely unequal adversaries. The superior power was able to establish air superiority and capture most of the territory within days of the first strike. The other side had no option but to relent and retreat so that it could survive to fight another day.
Be it the twenty-year-long Afghanistan war, the Iraq war, the many wars of Israel in the Middle East, or even the last Soviet war in Afghanistan, one side simply dispersed and disappeared, only to regroup and come back stronger for guerilla warfare. There was no active frontline, no pitched battles for control of every inch of land, no recurring waves of infantry charges against unremitting machine fire, tactics we have now come to associate with the two great World Wars fought in the first half of last century.
The last war that resembles the current Russia-Ukraine war – fought over years between two large armies pitched against each other over a long frontline was the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988).
This absence of intense large-scale war fought for every inch of territory led many military planners to believe that long wars fought between two large, modern armies have become a thing of the past. Of course, all these misplaced beliefs are now out of the window.
In Military Review, the US Army’s professional journal, Colonel Daniel Sukman (R) of the U.S. Army writes that the Ukraine war created a “learning laboratory for the joint force at the tactical, operational, strategic, and institutional levels of war. The important lessons, however, tend to be those that nations learn time and time again and are lessons that destroy the myths and legends that often rise during peacetime.”
As the nearly three-year-old Ukraine war enters a new dangerous phase, where US and European countries have allowed Ukraine to use their long-range missiles for strikes deep inside Russia, and Moscow has updated and lowered its nuclear threshold and used history’s first Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) ballistic missile Oreshnik in a war situation, we take a look at some of the obvious lessons of this war that no country can afford to ignore.
Wars Have A Habit Of Becoming ‘Protracted Wars’
History is full of instances where nations fell victim to the myth that they could start a war, win it swiftly and decisively, and then end it on their own terms. However, once started, wars pretty much have a life and logic of their own, and they refuse to come to a logical conclusion. Wars have a habit of becoming ‘protracted wars,’ and often, even superpowers fail to achieve a quick victory against a backward, poor, and disorganized country.
In his book The Allure of Battle, author Cathal Nolen lists many protracted wars that began with the faulty notion that a nation could quickly achieve its strategic objectives by using the military option, be it the Napoleonic Wars, the U.S. Civil War or Germany in the two World Wars.
In the last century, the US committed the same mistake in Vietnam, thinking it could easily crush a disorganized agricultural society. The Vietnam War lasted 14 years. The Soviet Union fell victim to the same myth of swift victory in Afghanistan. In this century, the US again walked into the same trap in Afghanistan, thinking it could quickly dislodge the Taliban, a loose grouping of tribals, from Kabul. Twenty years later, the US walked out of Afghanistan, handing over power to the same Taliban.
Unfortunately, such is the allure of power and quick victory that nations just refuse to learn this lesson. In February 2022, Russia set about its invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s leadership expected to crush the Ukrainian army with several powerful strikes, capture the capital and several regional centers, and thus, in a matter of days, defeat Ukraine and effect a regime change in Kyiv. Russia thought it could occupy Ukraine and achieve its strategic objectives within a week before the world could formulate a response to its aggression. However, the war that was supposed to last a week is still going on after 1000 days with no end in sight.
Protracted wars could also stretch your resources, even if you have a lot of resources. It can put tremendous strain on your manpower and equipment, far more than military planners could anticipate before the war. To carry out a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Federation used approximately 200,000 men. However, by December 2023, according to Vladimir Putin, there were already about 617,000 soldiers in the combat zone.
To meet the requirement of this colossal manpower, Russia has ordered partial mobilizations, used the mercenaries of the private militia group Wagner, forcefully conscripted Wagner mercenaries into its army, and recruited convicted prisoners from prisons all over Russia. Despite all this, Russia still felt the need to replenish its frontline ranks with soldiers from North Korea. The Pentagon believes over 10,000 North Korean soldiers are already fighting with Russian forces on the frontline.
According to the Wall Street Journal, over 200,000 Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine. As per The Economist, Ukraine has also lost between 60,000 and 100,000 soldiers.
Russia has also suffered tremendous equipment losses. According to the UK Defense Journal, Russian equipment losses include 3,558 tanks, 147 helicopters, 132 fixed-wing aircraft, and more than 8,500 armored vehicles, alongside 26 vessels damaged or destroyed in the Black Sea.
Protracted wars could also be very expensive, even if you’re only fighting a proxy war. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, since the war began, the U.S. Congress has voted through five bills that have provided Ukraine with over US$175 billion.
These figures show that it is nearly impossible to realistically estimate the manpower, equipment, and financial muscle a country needs to enter a war.
There Is No Alternative to Heavy Artillery
While modern warfare has changed dramatically, and both sides have introduced newer technology in the current conflict, from the latest air defense systems to First-Person View (FPV) drones, there is still no alternative to heavy artillery in long grinding wars.
To underscore this point, just some numbers will suffice. Until November 2024, Ukraine has received nearly 1 million artillery shells from the EU, over 3 million artillery shells from the US, over half a million from the Czech Republic, and over a million from other individual European states. In addition to these, Ukraine produces millions of shells annually.
On the other hand, according to NATO intelligence estimates of Russian defense production, Moscow was producing over 250,000 monthly artillery munitions by March. Given Russia’s shift to a war-driven economy, this output must have increased since then. It can be safely assumed that Russia produces over 3 million artillery munitions annually. And despite producing 3 million artillery shells a year, Russia is reportedly also heavily importing artillery shells from North Korea.
This colossal ammunition output enables Russia to fire thousands of artillery rounds daily. According to experts, Russia’s current artillery expenditure rate is over 10,000 daily rounds. At one point in April-May, Ukrainian officials said Russia was even firing 60,000 to 70,000 rounds per day.
Ukraine started at a disadvantage but is now fast catching up. Kyiv’s artillery expenditure rate is nearly one-fifth of the Russian average, mostly averaging 2,000 rounds daily and never crossing the high of 10,000 rounds daily.
This means that both sides have been firing 15,000 to 20,000 artillery shells at each other daily, at least for the past 18 months.
For Russia, artillery was always the undisputed King. Russia never came out of the Soviet mindset that ‘artillery wins the war.’ This dependence on heavy artillery goes back a long way and, in many ways, resembles the Second World War.
People should remember that during the last days of the Second World War, the Soviet Red Army fired over two million rounds in Berlin, a city already on the verge of collapse. The Battle of the Seelowe Heights, which opened the Red Army’s path to Berlin, began with Soviet artillery firing 500,000 shells in just 30 minutes.
Joseph Stalin even called heavy artillery “the god of war.”
The lessons the Soviets learned during the Second World War have been the core of Russian military strategy for decades. Russian military doctrine believes that amassed heavy artillery guns are key to winning any war, especially a protracted war that has transformed into a ‘war of attrition.’
On the other hand, the development of modern airplanes made artillery look obsolete, and it was gradually downgraded, especially by the NATO powers and Israel, who believed establishing air superiority was key to winning modern wars. This approach resulted in a systematic neglect of munitions by Western countries for decades.
This strategic neglect of ammunition has cost Ukraine dearly in the current war. Figures provided by a senior officer on Ukraine’s general staff demonstrate the deadly difference artillery makes.
“When Ukraine was firing 10,000 shells per day, between 35 and 45 Ukrainian soldiers were killed daily… But when the daily fire fell to half that, more than 100 Ukrainian soldiers were killed per day. These projectiles build a wall for our soldiers,” the officer said.
According to the Council on Foreign Relations, in the Ukraine war, artillery fire accounts for about 80 percent of the casualties on both sides.
In a November interview with RBC-Ukraine, Sergey Musienko, Deputy Commander of the Missile Troops and Artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, explained the crucial role of artillery.
“At present, artillery remains the main means of destruction on the battlefield. These include missile systems, multiple launch rocket systems, artillery guns and mortars, which inflict destruction both in front of the front line of defense and at a fairly large range.”
“At present, missile forces and artillery remain the priority means, which, I think, will remain the main component of fire damage to the enemy for a long time to come.”
Musienkoalso said that the role of artillery is actually becoming more crucial.
“The trend of developing missile forces and artillery is gaining momentum. New types of missiles are emerging, new launchers and warheads are being modernized and created. The same applies to artillery – barrel, rocket and even mortars – modern technologies will never completely replace it. And drones will never replace artillery in fire damage, we see this today on the battlefield.”
The importance of artillery can hardly be overstated, especially in a war fought between two large armies who can fight each other to a grinding stalemate.
Moreover, artillery has some distinct advantages. It can fire day and night and in any weather condition, and modern electronic warfare cannot jam it.
While modern technologies will play a role in the war, the outcome of the Ukraine war will likely depend on which side can sustain its use of artillery fire for a longer period.
Western countries might have ignored shells and other artillery ammunition production for years in favor of superior air power and precision-guided weapons. Still, the Ukraine war has clearly established that in a long-drawn-out conventional war, where two large armies face each other over a front line extending hundreds of miles, where the use of air force is limited due to the fielding of superior air defense systems by both sides, the war ultimately boils down to artillery and infantry warfare.
The Rise Of FPV Drone Warfare
In July, former Google boss Eric Schmidt wrote an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal praising Ukraine’s use of small FPV drones and predicting a future where they replace other expensive weapons like million-dollar tanks.
Schmidt is also the founder of White Stork, a startup that aims to develop AI-driven attack drones. His basic proposition is deceptively simple: Drones are cheap, can be mass-produced quickly, and offer precision at a much lower cost.
“Deployed in volume, this first-person-view drone—invented for the sport of drone racing—is cheaper than a mortar round and more accurate than artillery fire,” wrote Schmidt. “Kamikaze drones cost around US$400 and can carry up to 3 pounds of explosives.”
Some drones can carry payloads of up to 5 pounds or anti-tank hand grenades.
Social Media platform X (formerly Twitter) has dozens of videos showing FPV drones taking out tanks and armored vehicles and even forcing soldiers out of their trenches. Some FPV drones were even seen lobbying hand grenades in tanks and then racing back to their base safely to deliver another mission.
These drones usually cost just US$400. They are so cheap that they can be used even against military trucks, jeeps, or even soldiers. In comparison, military-grade anti-tank loitering munitions like the Israeli Hero-120 cost somewhere over US$150,000.
FPVs can also hit fast-moving targets with great precision. They are small enough to be operated in trees, bushes, or even under tunnels and bunkers. Drones are light, so each soldier can carry multiple drones, solving logistics issues.
Drones offer so many advantages that they can replace big artillery guns and long-range rocket launchers. Before Ukraine was allowed to use US-supplied long-range missiles in Russia, it successfully used drones to strike deep inside Russia, in Crimea, and even in Moscow.
A Billy Mitchell Moment?
Writing in Forbes, David Hambling says that FPV drones might be another Billy Mitchell moment for military strategy planners.
Then, as the Assistant Chief of the U.S. military’s new Air Service, Mitchell tried to impress upon the US Navy that bombers could sink battleships and that a thousand bombers could be built for the cost of one battleship.
Mitchell was initially dismissed by US Generals who were dead sure about the utility of battleships with big guns. Mitchell showed the effectiveness of bombers in military exercises on numerous occasions, where small planes were able to sink big battleships, yet no one took him seriously. The US Navy was dismissive of him, and few believed that flimsy planes could outperform big battleships.
But Mitchell was proved right some years later during the Second World War when flimsy planes repeatedly sank big battleships even before they reached their target or got the chance to fire their big guns.
In the Russia-Ukraine war, we might be seeing another Mitchell moment, when much more expensive tanks are tracked and then destroyed by flimsy drones, even before the tanks have reached their target or had the chance to fire their first round.
The Ukraine war has even been called a graveyard of tanks, and FPV drones have played a big role in it. It would be an exaggeration to say that drones alone can win the war, but it is safe to say that in the future, no war can be won without effectively employing drones.
The Rise Of Military Bloggers
In 1990, during the first Gulf War, the world witnessed a new innovation in war: live coverage of war. It was the first war that was televised live around the world (and around the clock). During the first days of the bombing, the CNN team was able to report live via radio from their hotel suite in the Rashid Hotel. Later studies showed how the live coverage of the war mobilized public opinion in the US in favor of war.
Columbia University professor Douglas Kellner argued that the media framed the war as an exciting narrative, turning it into a dramatic, patriotic spectacle. The media presented a view that seemed to identify solely with the American military, helping to create a narrative in favor of war.
India witnessed something similar during the Kargil War in 1999. During the Kargil War, live reporting from the front lines helped shape domestic support for India’s war. It mobilized the whole country behind the army. The coverage of soldiers’ hardships, the tremendous dangers they faced on the frontlines, and the thin line separating bravery and death all created a narrative of Just War. This support from the masses can be crucial for building a nation’s resolve during the tough days of the war.
Media coverage during the war can build an emotional connection with the soldiers. By raising national awareness about the conflict, the challenges soldiers face, and the sacrifices made, the media can fuel nationalistic sentiment and bolster public support for the troops.
Writing in India Today on July 26, 1999, Namrata Joshi said: “War will never be the same for Indians again. Television coverage of the action-packed weeks in Kargil changed the very way we perceive a battle. It started rather tentatively: stock shots of booming Bofors guns, marching soldiers, and endless rounds of press briefings. But soon, the momentum of the medium took over, and there were stories laced with the taste of cordite and the raw smell of adventure. Of TV reporters scampering over the mountain sides communicating their thrill.”
This is the reason that the Kargil War is itched in the Indian psyche like no other war, even though India has fought three more wars, all of them on a bigger scale than Kargil.
This live coverage also created some instant sensations, for instance, Lt Captain Vikram Batra, who, after retaking Point 5140-a vital peak in the Drass sector, in an interview with NDTV’s reporter BarkhaDutt said: “My company’s success signal was ‘Yeh Dil Maange More (my heart wants more).’ The guys were so highly charged up that they wanted that more bunkers should have been there, and we would have got more chaps.”
This phrase is still immortalized in the Indian psyche.
In The Ukraine war, we witnessed the emergence of a new medium for war coverage. A war telecasted on social media.
The Russian military bloggers had played a huge role in building support for the war in Russia, mobilizing the country behind troops, building Russian civilians’ resolve to fight this long war, and galvanizing the civil society to transform into a war economy.
These “military bloggers” (mil blogger) are mostly ultra-nationalists. Their hardline voices have created support for adopting an even more aggressive approach to the war. Also, they are immensely popular. War correspondent Semyon Pegov, known as War Gonzo, has more than 1.2 million subscribers on Telegram. Another pro-war blogger, Boris Rozhin, who blogs as Colonel Cassad, has 800,000 subscribers on Telegram.
Sometimes, they question the tactics adopted by local military commanders but without ever questioning the need for the ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine or the leadership of Putin.
Writing for the US Institute of Peace, Donald N. Jensen says that the huge popularity of these “military bloggers” has made it more difficult for Putin to bring the war to a negotiated conclusion.
Jensen also suggests that while traditional media is losing credibility, Putin has found new allies in ‘military bloggers,’ who enjoy more credibility and can generate public opinion in support of the war.
“Milbloggers play a critical role in soldier and mercenary recruitment campaigns and in collecting donations for troops. Powerful political figures such as Prigozhin and Russian Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov — though not milbloggers — also use Telegram to advance their agendas and opaquely sponsor milbloggers as megaphones for their political aims,” Jensen says.
The influence of these war bloggers can be gauged from the fact that now even Ukraine has its own war bloggers who are trying to push the Ukrainian narrative. Also, controlling these bloggers might be more difficult than controlling established media. Still, in coming wars, bloggers will play an important role, and defense establishments must adopt a cohesive policy to deal with this new element in pushing their war narrative.
It Was Premature To Write Obituaries Of Infantry
Since ancient times, infantry has been at the heart of any land-based war. Be it the phalanxes of ancient Greece, the legions of Rome, or even the medieval Turkish Janissaries, infantry has always been at the center of military strategy.
With the advent of gunpowder, infantry soldiers were given muskets. In the Second World War, mechanized infantry units fought with the aid of artillery and sometimes air support.
However, the lack of an active frontline in the Gulf Wars and the Afghanistan and Iraq wars led some to believe that the glory days of infantry were over.
Some started believing that wars could be fought and won through air operations only. The Ukraine war changed that, with both sides heavily dependent on mechanized infantry charges.
In a November interview with RBC-Ukraine, Sergey Musienko, Deputy Commander of the Missile Troops and Artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, spoke at length about Russian forces’ dependence on Infantry.
“Russia relies on infantry invasion in combat operations, regardless of any losses: 1-2 enemy soldiers try to run forward, then they accumulate and go on the assault. And, unfortunately, this tactic, supported by artillery and missile strikes, allows the occupiers to push through.”
“They are now using small group tactics, even 1-2 people run forward, into cover, gather and then proceed to assault. They use armored vehicles and various vehicles such as motorcycles, ATVs, buggies, with the task of approaching our positions as quickly as possible and engaging in a firefight at our positions.”
In the Ukraine War, everything depends on the infantry’s resilience. Musienko also believes that the side with the more resilient infantry will ultimately win the war.
“The enemy is betting on its infantry, and now on Korean reinforcements, and on powerful long-range fire damage – primarily KAB strikes, missile strikes. And in order to contain this invasion, in addition to all the measures for preparing, conducting and supporting the operation in all directions, there must be trained, motivated infantry. “
Despite technological advancements, holding territory requires infantry. A territory is not occupied unless there is an infantry soldier standing on the ground.
If the battle is between two large, well-trained armies, it will ultimately become a battle of wits between the infantries. FPV Drones, artillery fire, long-range missiles, and air support will all play their part, but their role would be to support infantry advance. Unless the infantry can move forward, the war is a stalemate.
Limited Air Force Role
The Ukraine war has also shown that establishing air superiority at the onset is essential for a swift, decisive victory. The Russian Air Force’s failure to establish air superiority at the outset cost Vladimir Putin’s forces the ability to achieve a decisive victory at the start of the conflict.
In the Ukraine war, both sides possess lethal air defenses that deny opposing air forces the ability to penetrate their battlespace. Currently, neither Russia nor Ukraine is using combat aircraft to conduct deep strikes, relying instead on long-range missiles and drones. This is despite the fact that Russia even owns a fifth-generation stealth aircraft, the Sukhoi Su-57. However, the lethal air defenses on both sides have resulted in a state of air parity in which neither force completely controls the skies.
This is another crucial lesson from the 1000-day war in Ukraine. In a war in which both sides possess advanced air defense systems and, consequently, either side is unable to establish air superiority decisively, the war will turn into an attrition-based long conflict with a heavy role for infantry and artillery.
With sufficient surface-to-air missiles and advanced air defense systems, even a much inferior and smaller air force can deny air superiority to a much larger force and force them to fight on the ground with infantry and artillery, as Kyiv has forced Moscow to fight on the ground despite the latter’s superior and much larger air force.
Military planners must take note of it. While combat aircraft are glamorous, no army should ignore infantry and artillery.
The Ukraine war is qualitatively different from the wars fought so far in this century. The lessons learned in this war will help military doctrine makers for decades to come. Russia and Ukraine have learned these lessons the hard way, after losing tremendous manpower and resources. The rest of the world, however, can learn these lessons for free.
- Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK.
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- He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com
