In a significant development, Indian foreign secretary Vikram Misri recently met with his Afghan counterpart, Amir Khan Muttaqi, in Dubai for the first high-level talks between the two countries since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021.
Some political analysts infer that India’s move to upgrade the level of diplomatic talks with the Taliban in Afghanistan is a reaction to Pakistan’s newly discovered bonhomie with Bangladesh’s caretaker government led by Muhammad Yunus.
Some would even interpret the visit as New Delhi capitalizing on the tensions between Kabul and Islamabad.
Some analysts argued that since India has lost some of its influence in neighboring countries like Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, etc., New Delhi is under pressure to refurbish its image as the world’s largest democracy by clinging to some of the neighbors where she has takers. This is the reason why India has upgraded the level of talks.
This is a myopic view of Indo-Afghan relations, usually taken by those who are ignorant about the history of India’s relations with Afghanistan from very distant times.
History Of India-Afghanistan Relations
India-Afghanistan relations go back a long time in history. The Hindu Shahi dynasty, founded by one Kellar, a Brahman vizier by faith, laid the foundation of the Hindu Shahi Kingdom of Kabul Valley and its surrounding regions after overthrowing Lagaturman, the last Turk Shahi king, in around 890 CE.
The Brahman Shahis of North Gandhara (meaning Kabul) had cordial relations with the ancient Kashmir Hindu kingdom of Karkota rulers.
Peshawar (Pushkalavati), Balkh (Bhakri), Kabul (Kapisa), and Pakti (Pakhtia) are some of the area names distinctly mentioned in the Vedas. India’s connection with North Gandhara (meaning Kabul Valley) strengthened through the instrumentality of Buddhism during the times of the powerful Kushan Empire.
During India’s freedom struggle against colonial rule, Afghan rulers often provided a safe haven to many Indian political activists facing sedition charges in India. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, known as Frontier Gandhi, was an ardent Gandhiite who never accepted the 1947 partition of India.
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Channels Of Development
In the post-independence period, India practically strengthened cordial relations with Afghanistan by opening channels for infrastructure development in that landlocked country. India has invested more than US$3 billion in Afghanistan’s developmental projects.
Shaida Mohammad Abdali, Afghanistan’s former ambassador to India, pointed out in April 2017 that India “is the biggest regional donor to Afghanistan and fifth largest donor globally with over US$3 billion in assistance.” India has built over 200 schools, sponsors over 1,000 scholarships, and hosts over 16,000 Afghan students.
Relations between Afghanistan and India received a major boost in 2011 when Afghanistan signed its first strategic partnership agreement since the Soviet-Afghan War.
India’s contribution to Afghanistan’s development is very substantial. Salma Dam, officially the Afghan-India Friendship Dam, is a hydroelectric and irrigation dam project located on the Hari River in western Afghanistan’s Chishti Sharif District of Herat Province.
The Afghan cabinet renamed the Salma Dam the Afghan-India Friendship Dam to strengthen relations between the two countries. The hydroelectric plant produces 42 MW of power and irrigates 75,000 hectares of farmland. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and then Afghan President Ashraf Ghani opened the dam on June 4, 2016.
Delicate Era
It is true that during the first stint of Taliban rule (1996–2001), India had limited interaction with the Taliban regime owing to her deep commitment to human rights and democratic principles. So, there was a stalemate in bilateral relations.
India closed down its mission in Kabul, withdrew the workforce engaged in construction work in Afghanistan, and even stopped the issuance of visas to Afghan nationals.
The Indian embassy was attacked and damaged several times, perhaps at the prompting of Pakistani handlers of Taliban fighters. Despite these challenges, in her dealings with Afghanistan, India never lost sight of the overall spectrum of historical relations between the two countries.
Perception Change
During the Taliban war against the US and NATO forces, India maintained its distance from the strife-torn country. But after the withdrawal of the US forces on August 5, 2021, and the Taliban taking control of power after the ouster of the elected government, India felt that the regime change in Afghanistan was the ground reality.
Consequently, India decided to be more pragmatic in its dealings with the Taliban.
After all, the Taliban were in the seat of power, American and NATO forces had left ignominiously, and the state forces raised during the elected government had surrendered to the Taliban.
However, the world community, including India and the UN, has not recognized the Taliban regime so far. Still, officials of many countries have been quietly interacting with Taliban leadership at various levels.
Even after the Taliban’s takeover, in January 2022, India sent 500,000 COVID-19 vaccine doses to Afghanistan as humanitarian aid. In February 2022, India sent 50 trucks carrying 2,500 MT of wheat. In June 2022, India sent 27 tonnes of emergency relief assistance to Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 5.9-magnitude earthquake.
In February 2023, India announced development aid of Rs 200 crore to Afghanistan. In March 2023, India announced sending 20,000 tonnes of wheat to Afghanistan through Iran’s Chahbahar Port. As of 2023, around 14,000 Afghan students were studying in India with scholarship support from different Indian institutions.
Significance Of Misri-Muttaqi Talks
In a press release on January 8, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs summarized the Misri-Muttaqi talks. The Afghan Minister appreciated and thanked the Indian leadership for continuing to engage with and support the Afghan people.
Given the current need for development activities, India decided to consider engaging in development projects in addition to the ongoing humanitarian assistance program.
It may be recalled that in response to the needs of the Afghan people, India decided to extend humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. So far, India has dispatched several shipments consisting of 50,000 MTs of wheat, 300 tons of medicines, 27 tons of earthquake relief aid, 40,000 liters of pesticides, 100 million polio doses, 1.5 million doses of COVID-19 vaccine, 11,000 units of hygiene kits for the drug de-addiction program, 500 units of winter clothing, and 1.2 tons of stationery kits, etc.
In response to the Afghan request, India will provide further material support to the health sector and rehabilitate refugees. The two sides also discussed strengthening sports (cricket) cooperation, which is highly valued by Afghanistan’s young generation.
They also agreed to promote using Chabahar port to support trade and commercial activities, including humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan.
The Afghan side underlined its sensitivities to India’s security concerns. The two sides agreed to remain in touch and continue regular contact at various levels.
Conclusion
In a statement issued a day after Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met the ‘Foreign Minister’ of the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA),’ the Taliban expressed gratitude for Indian humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people. They informed that the Iranian port of Chabahar was discussed between the two sides during the talks.
Both countries recognize the importance of Chabahar port as a transit link between India and Afghanistan. It means India no longer depends on the overland link with Afghanistan via Pakistan.
India developed the Chabahar port not only to establish a trade and commerce link with Afghanistan but also to take it further to Central Asia by rail connectivity via Sarakhs on the Turkmenistan-Iran border.
The next part of the Chabahar project is the road and rail link between Chahbahar, Kabul, and Helmand Valley, which will ultimately connect Kabul with Ashkhabad in Turkmenistan.
- Prof. KN Pandita (Padma Shri) is the former director of the Center of Central Asian Studies at Kashmir University.
- This article contains the author’s personal views and does not represent EurAsian Times’ policies/views/opinions in any way.
- The author can be reached at knp627 (at) gmail.com