President Xi Jinping has called on China’s airborne troops to strengthen their combat preparedness, underscoring the strategic importance of paratroopers in a potential Taiwan conflict.
Chinese state media reported that Xi Jinping emphasized the necessity for airborne forces to adapt to the evolving demands of modern warfare during a rare visit on November 4 to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Airborne Corps headquarters in Xiaogan, Hubei province.
Xi, who holds multiple leadership titles as General Secretary of the Communist Party, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and President, stressed the special role that airborne units play in China’s military strategy.
Addressing top military officials, he highlighted the need for paratroopers to fully integrate into the PLA’s combat framework, aligning with the Air Force’s modernization goals.
He called for “all-out efforts” to enhance training programs, technical capabilities, and mission readiness to establish the airborne force as a formidable element in China’s military power.
During the inspection, Xi was briefed on new equipment, including advanced bird-like reconnaissance drones that can blend into natural environments and the latest airborne armored infantry vehicles, outfitted with defensive systems to counter incoming threats.
This is Xi’s first inspection of the airborne force. His visit also acknowledged recent advancements and progress made by the unit. He praised the corps’ achievements and reiterated that it must continue to push forward to meet the Party’s objectives.
The inspection aligns with Beijing’s heightened focus on Taiwan, an island China considers a breakaway province that should be reunited with the mainland by force if necessary.
Most international governments, including the United States, acknowledge Beijing’s claim to Taiwan but oppose any attempts at military unification.
Taiwan’s President, William Lai Ching-te, recently asserted the country’s autonomy, and China responded with extensive military drills around the island last month.
Xi’s visit to the airborne force headquarters followed an earlier tour of the mainland province of Fujian, right across Taiwan, last month. There, he visited a strategic missile base in Anhui, inspecting the PLA’s readiness in the region.
PLA Airborne Forces To Play A Key Role In Taiwan Contingency
In the event of a Taiwan contingency, the airborne forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are poised to play a critical role in any military campaign.
Analysts, scholars, and policy experts in both the United States and Taiwan have long speculated on potential decapitation strike scenarios and the feasibility of an airborne invasion, both of which are widely regarded as key components of China’s military strategy.
The PLA Airborne Corps, established in 1950, was initially formed as a rapid-response unit with the primary objective of “liberating Taiwan.” This mission remains central to the airborne corps’ role within the PLA.
In this context, President Xi Jinping’s recent call for “all-out efforts” to improve training, enhance technical capabilities, and bolster the airborne force’s overall mission readiness is seen as an important move to ensure that China’s military forces are fully prepared for a potential invasion of Taiwan.
His directive is crucial in transforming the airborne corps into a more formidable component of the PLA, capable of executing complex military operations with greater precision and efficiency.
Historically, the PLA airborne forces have faced considerable challenges in terms of capability and preparedness when compared to their counterparts in the United States and Russia.
In the past, the PLA struggled with logistical issues, particularly in terms of airlift capacity, and its airborne troops even lacked the necessary firepower and operational capabilities.
One notable example of these limitations occurred in 2008 when the PLA deployed 500 soldiers to assist in disaster recovery efforts following a devastating earthquake in Sichuan province.
Despite the urgent nature of the mission, only 15 of the paratroopers could land accurately due to adverse weather conditions and difficult terrain, highlighting the operational shortcomings of the airborne units.
However, since then, China’s paratrooper force has made major advancements and enhanced its readiness. Earlier this year, the Institute for National Defence and Security Research, a think tank based in Taipei, highlighted in its annual report that the PLA’s airborne forces would likely be a “main force” in any future military operation targeting Taiwan.
The report further advised Taiwan’s defense planners to prioritize the protection of key infrastructure, such as ports and airports, to prevent the PLA from gaining access to critical landing zones.
In extreme scenarios, it suggested that Taiwan may need to seal off ports and damage airstrips to block PLA forces from securing key footholds.
Russia’s Airborne Disaster At Hostomel Airport
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has presented several important lessons for Chinese military strategists, particularly regarding the risks and challenges associated with airborne operations.
One of the most notable examples is the Russian mission to seize Hostomel Airport (also known as Antonov Airport) in the early days of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
This operation, which was meant to deliver a swift and decisive blow to Ukrainian forces, highlights the challenges and potential fatalities that can arise from poorly executed airborne missions. This lesson could prove valuable for China as it contemplates its own military strategies.
The initial objective behind the assault on Hostomel was to secure a strategic airlift point for Russian forces. The plan was to use Russian Special Forces and airlift capability to overwhelm Ukrainian resistance quickly.
If successful, Russian troops, armor, artillery, and supplies could be flown into the airport, allowing them to deploy into Kyiv and overthrow the Ukrainian government rapidly.
To execute this mission, Russia tasked its elite Airborne Forces (VDV), particularly the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade, a unit with extensive combat experience from operations in Chechnya, Crimea, and Donbas.
The operation began on February 24 with a coordinated attack involving a large number of Russian Ka-52 “Alligator” attack helicopters, which used low-flying tactics to avoid radar detection.
These helicopters launched guided missiles and fired cannons at the airport’s defenses, hoping to suppress Ukrainian forces long enough for a landing. Despite strong resistance, which resulted in the loss of several Russian helicopters, the assault continued for several hours.
Russian forces fully captured Hostomel Airport on February 25, 2022. Following this, the Russian Army and the VDV (Russian Airborne Forces) aimed to transform the airport into a critical forward operating base for their planned push toward Kyiv.
However, at this point, Russia’s offensive began to face significant setbacks. Russia’s failure to clear the area around the airport quickly led to disaster.
Ukrainian forces, including special operations units from the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, launched a counteroffensive.
Local partisan fighters and Ukrainian forces on the ground inflicted major damage on the Russian forces. In one of the most pivotal moments of the battle, a sniper killed Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky, the commanding general of the Russian 7th Airborne Division, by the end of February 2022.
The invasion’s initial momentum slowed, leading to the infamous 40-mile-long convoy and entire units of Russian troops stalling due to fuel shortages, significantly hindering their advance.
By March 4, Russian state television aired footage showing large numbers of destroyed Russian military equipment, struck by Ukrainian artillery, scattered across the base. The Russian forces stationed there had become immobilized without clear orders to advance or retreat.
Video from Hostomel of the destroyed An-225 transport aircraft. https://t.co/5JhZaKZ8LS pic.twitter.com/mnLqgKi9nM
— Rob Lee (@RALee85) March 4, 2022
The situation remained dire until March 29, when Russian commanders finally issued the order to retreat from Kyiv Oblast. This marked the beginning of the Russian withdrawal from Hostomel, with damaged equipment that could not be evacuated. Ukrainian artillery fire targeted the retreating forces, adding to their difficulties.
Among the equipment left behind were 16 modern BMD-4M armored fighting vehicles and a 1L262E Rtut-BM electronic warfare system. These items were either destroyed during the retreat preparation or intentionally blown up by Russian forces.
When Ukrainian troops reentered Hostomel, they found evidence of the hastily abandoned Russian positions, with remnants of daily life scattered around.
These included unopened food packages, personal items like passports and bank cards, and even Ukrainian armored vehicles that had been captured by Russian forces but could not be taken with them.
The Russian failure to capture Hostomel Airport offers crucial insights for China, especially as it contemplates potential military actions in Taiwan. The loss of surprise, the inability to clear surrounding areas, and the vulnerability of airborne operations to counterattacks demonstrated how quickly airborne missions can go wrong.
Furthermore, the extensive damage to the airport’s infrastructure—deliberately inflicted by Ukrainian forces to render the airstrip unusable—showed how a lack of operational flexibility can turn the tide of battle.
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