The geopolitical equations in South Asia are undergoing a tectonic shift — a major concern for Indian foreign policy experts.
Chinese warships docked in Bangladesh for the first time since the new government took over in August, and Nepal’s Prime Minister made his maiden visit to Beijing, breaking the tradition of visiting New Delhi first; meanwhile, Dhaka and Islamabad are getting closer than they have been since their partition in 1971.
Under pressure from New Delhi, Sri Lanka put a moratorium on Chinese survey vessels docking at its port. However, that moratorium will end on December 31st this year. India has very smartly balanced its ties with both Russia and the West, but it is losing allies in the neighborhood.
“India’s sphere of influence, which has remained strong over South Asia since independence, is on the decline. China’s trade, connectivity, political, military, and soft power engagement with each South Asian country has increased manifold over the past decade. As a result, despite its increasing global prominence, India’s influence is paradoxically weakening in South Asia,” Dr. Happymon Jacob wrote in an article after Prime Minister Narendra Modi won a third term.
Nepal’s Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli broke with tradition in his fourth term by heading to Beijing before New Delhi. The Global Times said that the visit indicated India’s “increasingly weakening control over the South Asian region structure.”
During his visit, Prime Minister Oli met Chinese President Xi Jinping. Nepal and China inked the much-awaited framework agreement on the multi-billion dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), paving the way for enhanced economic cooperation on the projects.
BRI is Xi Jinping’s flagship project, connecting China with Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe. Nepal and China signed the BRI agreement in 2017; however, not a single project has been implemented under the framework.
The China-Nepal joint statement released after the visit emphasized that “the two sides agreed to jointly advance the fourth phase of the China-aided Araniko Highway maintenance project and the Hilsa-Simikot Road project, implement the second phase of the Kathmandu Ring Road Improvement Project, and welcome the signing of the Letters of Exchange for the Approval of the China-aid Project of Feasibility Study for the Tokha-Chhahare Tunnel.”
China’s charm offensive in Nepal might be veering the Himalayan country away from India. In 2024, the already volatile ties between India and Nepal hit another obstacle as Nepal introduced a new currency note that features the territories claimed by India.
Then Nepal’s prime minister Pushpakamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ decided to print the new map of Nepal, which includes the territory of Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura, and Kalapani in the Rs 100 denomination bank notes. The new map on the currency note comes after the Nepal government termed India’s claims on the territories as “artificial enlargement” and “untenable.”
Nepal shares a border of over 1,850 km with five Indian states: Sikkim, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakhand. Given that Nepal is a “buffer state” between China and India, both countries have power aspirations in the region, and the Kalapani dispute can impact relations between the three.
Nepal and India have shared strong ties since the latter’s independence. A 1950 bilateral treaty made Nepal India’s protectorate and made India responsible for its defense. With time, Nepal has been seeking changes in the treaty and a more equal status with India.
Nepal, a landlocked country, has always depended on India for imports. Hence, India’s economic blockade of 2015 has been a rude awakening for the Himalayan country. The country has slowly drifted apart from India, and China has moved in to fill the vacuum with investments, aid, and loans.
India has also squandered its goodwill in the country, as its new recruitment scheme for the Indian Army excluded Nepalese Gurkhas from its Gurkha regiments. It has been nearly three years, and not a single Nepali Gurkha has joined the Indian Army, denting century-old ties.
After Submarines, More Chinese Fighter Jets For Bangladesh?
The ouster of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina in the Monsoon Revolution has spelled bad news for India. China has built a submarine base in Bangladesh, and it has been expected that Chinese submarines will also dock at this base in the future.
But the future might arrive sooner than envisaged. In October, the Chinese Navy’s warships docked at Bangladesh’s Chittagong port for the first time since the new government took over in August.
Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) Chief Air Chief Marshal Hasan Mahmood Khan visited China for nine days, sparking rumors about BAF going for another Chinese fighter jet despite earlier complaints about the poor quality of Chinese platforms.
Currently, Bangladesh is the world’s second-biggest purchaser of Chinese weapons, with two-thirds of its arms supplied by Beijing. And it is bound to increase in the future.
Dhaka may opt to buy arms from Beijing to circumvent geopolitical hurdles. Also, an expected over 10 percent drop in Bangladesh’s military procurement budgets this year might push it towards cheaper Chinese weapons. China also facilitates these acquisitions through credit and soft loans.
There have been reports that Beijing is likely to offer Dhaka a plethora of weapons and systems, including J-10C multirole combat aircraft, Z-10 attack helicopters, Wing Loong 1 attack drones, HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles, Yuan-class submarines, and Type 054 frigates. Bangladesh academics have also asked Bangladesh’s Interim government to go for Chinese JF-17 ‘Thunder’ fighter jets.
Since 2009, China has become the largest supplier of arms to Dhaka. It is estimated that Chinese weapons make up 82 percent of the Bangladesh Defense Forces’ total inventory. These include Ming-class diesel-electric attack submarines, Shadhinota-class C13B corvettes, MBT-2000 Type 90-II and VT-5 light tanks, HQ-7 short-range surface-to-air missiles, and 36 F-7BGI fighter jets. Beijing has also given Dhaka a license to build various Chinese small and light weapons.
Bangladesh Cutting Umbilical Cord With India?
The already frayed ties between India and Bangladesh were delivered another punch after Dhaka recalled its envoy from New Delhi in October. On November 5, Bangladesh’s interim government also recalled its acting Deputy High Commissioner in Kolkata and Assistant High Commissioner in Agartala in the wake of protests in India against the trial of Hindu leaders in Bangladesh.
At the same time, the Bangladesh National Board of Revenue (NBR) has eliminated the mandatory physical inspection of goods imported from Pakistan as part of ease of doing business. Pakistan has been the only country singled out for this benefit, raising concerns that this may lead to the illegal transfer of arms and contraband.
In a historical first since Bangladesh’s founding in 1971, a direct cargo ship from Pakistan docked at Bangladesh’s Chittagong port on November 11, signaling an unprecedented thaw in relations between the two countries, which had been part of the same nation for nearly a quarter century.
The cargo vessel from Karachi arrived at Bangladesh’s southeastern port city of Chittagong, marking the first-ever direct maritime contact between the two countries in over five decades.
Establishing a direct maritime link between India’s eastern and western neighbors signals a major realignment in the region and has alarmed New Delhi.
The new caretaker Bangladesh government is also expanding military ties with Islamabad. In September, Bangladesh ordered 40,000 rounds of ammunition, 2,000 units of tank ammunition, 40 tons of RDX explosives, and 2,900 high-intensity projectiles from Pakistan’s Ordnance Factories (POF).
Last month, Dhaka University Professor Shahiduzzamaneven called for a nuclear treaty between Bangladesh and Pakistan, citing concerns over India’s influence in the region and suggested that Pakistan’s Ghauri missiles should be deployed in Bangladesh.
Sri Lanka’s Balancing Act Between India & China
In November 2024, Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s leftist coalition won in snap parliamentary elections. Dissanayake’s National People’s Power (NPP) coalition secured a two-thirds majority in parliament, winning 159 of 225 seats, a huge lead on opposition alliance Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), which won 40 seats.
The NPP’s proximity to China and Dissanayake’s close relations with the Chinese Communist Party is cause for concern, and India will have to wait and watch to see how the new president will balance his country’s foreign relations with the various competing forces.
Dissanayake has historically criticized the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Accord and expressed ambivalence towards the 13th Amendment, which would have devolved powers to Tamil minorities.
During his presidential campaign, Dissanayake had pledged not to allow Sri Lanka’s territory to be used to threaten India or regional stability. This commitment addresses India’s concerns about China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean and its use of Sri Lankan ports for strategic purposes.
Now that the Sri Lankan moratorium on Chinese research vessels ends on December 31, it remains to be seen if the ban will be extended.
The changing geopolitical equations in South Asia call for recalibration not only at the level of the Indian military but also at the level of national security architecture.
