In the heart of West Africa, Mali stands at a critical crossroads, where military aspirations collide with economic desperation.
Mali’s transitional president and military junta leader, General Assimi Goita, recently announced the country’s ambitious plan to establish its own defense industry in 2025. The initiative includes setting up factories to assemble weapons and tactical vehicles and manufacture ammunition and explosives.
In his address to the nation, General Goita stated, “The process of equipping the armed and security forces will be improved in 2025 with the establishment of a defense industry.”
He emphasized that Bamako is “actively” working on installing facilities for assembling “individual and collective” tactical weapons and vehicles. The manufacturing of ammunition and explosives, including civilian-grade materials, is also part of the project. The ultimate goal, he added, is to make the country “militarily independent.”
However, this ambition comes laden with contradictions. How can Mali’s lofty goals take flight when much of its population struggles with hunger and poverty?
To better assess this strategic and economic move, it is essential to examine Mali’s economy, its broader political landscape, and its defense sector.
Mali’s Economy Hurdles
Economically, Mali faces significant hurdles. As one of Africa’s largest countries, it grapples with challenges tied to its vast size, location, and complex geopolitics.
Despite some growth driven by sectors like cotton, lithium mining, and industrial gold production, nearly 20% of Mali’s dispersed population lives in extreme poverty, primarily in the rural southern regions.
The country’s economy grew by 3.5% in 2022 and 5.2% in 2023 after the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) lifted financial sanctions imposed in 2022.
However, according to news reports, living conditions have worsened after the 2020 military coup. The nation grapples with constant power outages and deepening poverty. Public frustration continues to rise as the promises of the military government remain largely unmet.
Military Governance
Mali’s recent history is etched with political upheaval. Mali has endured years of jihadist and separatist violence, a backdrop that culminated in military coups in 2020 and 2021. President Assimi Goita seized power in 2021, taking control during the 64th anniversary celebrations of the Malian Armed Forces (Fama).
In November 2024, Goita made a significant move, ousting Prime Minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga and his government. Maïga, who was appointed by Goita in 2021 following a second coup that deposed transitional president Bah N’Daw, now finds himself sidelined.
Despite the junta’s earlier promise to return Mali to civilian rule with elections by March 2024, the vote has been delayed indefinitely.
To further entrench military control, Goita appointed his ally, General Abdoulaye Maïga, as interim prime minister—a move that deepens concerns about the tightening grip of the military on Mali’s government.
Corruption & Outsourced Security
Mali’s defense sector has long grappled with entrenched corruption. Still, the escalating conflict in recent years has allowed organized crime to embed itself deeper into both formal and informal economies, according to a recent report by ‘Transparency International Defence & Security’ (TI-DS) published in September 2024.
The systemic corruption has taken a toll, evident in reports of inadequate ammunition, malfunctioning weapons, and subpar protective gear for soldiers.
The report also paints a troubling picture of opacity in Mali’s defense governance, particularly in procurement processes. Without publicly available information, internal or external reviews of military purchases are nearly impossible, raising serious concerns about accountability.
One of the most alarming trends highlighted is the increasing reliance on private military and security companies (PMSCs). Notably, international firms like G4S and the Wagner Group operate freely in Mali despite laws requiring company directors to be Mali nationals.
Wagner Group: Russia’s Strategic Tool In Mali
Enter Russia—a partner with historical roots and contemporary ambitions.
Mali’s relationship with Russia dates back to 1960 when the Soviet Union became one of the first nations to recognize Mali’s independence and establish diplomatic ties. This historical connection has evolved into a strategic partnership, particularly in security and defense.
Following the withdrawal of French troops, Mali has leaned heavily on Moscow to bolster its military capabilities. Today, approximately 80% of Mali’s military equipment originates from Russia, creating a robust financial and logistical link between the two nations.
The ties deepened after Mali’s 2020 coup, with reports suggesting Russian involvement in training coup leaders like Assimi Goïta. Under Goïta’s military regime, Mali has welcomed the Wagner Group – which has steadily supplanted much of the Western influence previously present in the country.
Wagner has not only entrenched itself in the region but has also established two mining companies in Mali.
Wagner’s involvement comes with a dark side. The group is closely linked to the Russian state and has been implicated in severe human rights violations, including a 2022 massacre that claimed the lives of 500 civilians.
For Russia, Mali represents more than a bilateral relationship. The Military DIME (M-DIME), a research project by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), has shed light on Russia’s expanding influence in Mali.
The report reveals that the Russian private military company Wagner Group has firmly entrenched itself in the country, filling the vacuum left by the departure of a former multilateral security effort ousted by Mali’s ruling junta.
Wagner has become Russia’s primary tool for military influence in Mali, shaping the nation’s training, recruitment, operations, and strategic direction while gaining access to its local resources. The report warns that if Wagner solidifies its foothold in Mali, it could serve as a springboard for further expansion into other African nations, intensifying Russia’s influence across the continent.
Military-Diplomatic Ties With Russia
Recently, Russia has intensified its military-diplomatic outreach. In February 2023, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made a landmark visit to Mali, underscoring Moscow’s commitment to this burgeoning alliance. The collaboration has since gained momentum.
In late November, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, accompanied by senior defense officials, participated in a delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak and held discussions with Mali’s junta.
Russia’s backing soon translated into concrete military assistance, with a significant convoy of advanced Russian military equipment arriving in Bamako on January 17, 2025.
The shipment included state-of-the-art weaponry, such as T-72B3M tanks, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, and the recently introduced Spartakus armored vehicles equipped with S-60 guns.
Civilian-use vehicles, like Linza ambulances and Tigr vehicles, as well as engineering vehicles and two river patrol boats, were also part of the delivery.
According to the Military DIME project, Russia is expected to leverage its Military, Diplomatic, and Economic instruments to expand its influence in Mali and beyond over the next three years.
Mali’s ‘Defense’ Gambit
Mali’s defense industry initiative is a high-stakes gamble. It represents a nation’s attempt to rewrite its narrative.
The country’s reliance on Russia offers both opportunities and risks to its defense industry. While Moscow’s support could empower Mali’s military aspirations, it also raises questions about sovereignty and the long-term consequences of outsourcing security to foreign actors.
- Shubhangi Palve is a defense and aerospace journalist. Before joining the EurAsian Times, she worked for ET Prime. She has over 15 years of extensive experience in the media industry, spanning print, electronic, and online domains.
- Contact the author at shubhapalve (at) gmail.com
