BY: LT GEN A B SHIVANE (R)
The Indian PM’s recent visit to war-torn Ukraine, the first after its independence and preceded by a visit to Russia a few weeks ago, adds another chapter to the narrative of strategic balancing and geopolitical opportunism. The visit aims to strengthen bilateral cooperation and advocate for peace in the region. PM Modi and Zelensky’s hug is a symbolic counterpoint to the much-debated hug with Putin a few weeks back.
The visit is significant because it comes at a time when the Russia-Ukraine war canvas has enlarged, and the West is critical of India’s proximity to Russia.
The diplomatic messaging of the visit is India’s neutrality and its strategic maneuver of balancing the relationship between Russia and the West. The strategic messaging is that India has substantive ties with both Russia and Ukraine, and these partnerships stand independent of each other and are not a zero-sum game.
The visit has also raised hopes for India to restore the break in supply chains, with delegation-level discussions on collaboration in defense, economic and business relations, education, and science and technology.
India has adopted a balanced approach, refraining from condemning Russia while concurrently calling for peaceful resolution and respecting territorial integrity in the Russia-Ukraine war.
This stance has drawn criticism from the West, in particular, India’s Russian oil import trajectory, notwithstanding global sanctions. However, India’s relationship with Russia remains strategically enduring, while the West is strategically evolving. India is diversifying its relationships to reduce dependencies and further self-reliance, thus strategically balancing its relationship with both Russia and the US.
Russia remains a major supplier of military hardware to India, accounting for approximately 60% of its defense imports and a major oil supplier. Given its historical trust, shared national interest, deep defense ties, and deepening energy relationship, India cannot forsake this relationship.
There is also a concern about the warming up of relations between Russia and China and the possible rise of another pole between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as a counter to the West.
On the other hand, the US-India strategic relationship has evolved in military, economic, and technology spheres through bilateral trade, military engagement, and mutual concerns of a belligerent China, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.
India’s foreign policy acumen lies in balancing its strategic relationships with Russia, the US, and the West, minimizing contradictions, and maximizing cooperation through a better understanding of each other’s national interests.
The Kyiv Visit: The Diplomatic Tight Rope
The Kyiv visit is indicative of India’s foreign policy contours, wherein divergent and convergent national interests between nations make the relationship issue-based while upholding strategic autonomy.
Modi’s government has often emphasized the significance of multi-partnerships in a multilateral world order wherein India can engage with all major powers without being drawn into anybody’s camp. This visit thus walks a tight diplomatic rope, showing that India is willing to partner with Ukraine and the West without abandoning its ties with Russia.
Its timing as a follow-up of the recent Putin-Modi hug, which sparked Western outrage, is indicative of its regional interest and projection of a neutral global image.
Zelenskyy expressed his unhappiness at seeing the leader of the largest democracy in a cordial relationship with his arch-rival only to be visited and assured of India’s peace stand. Europe is strategically important to India in the context of trade, security, and contemporary geopolitics.
India’s relations with Ukraine are significant and independent, though not as deep as with Russia. Ukraine has a large Indian student diaspora and is an important trade partner.
In FY22, India’s goods trade with Ukraine was approximately $3.4 billion, and Ukraine ranks among India’s top 50 trade partners. Additionally, Ukraine has been a source of defense supplies, technology, ammunition, engines, and spares to India.
The transition to Atmanirbharta still requires them in the interim journey. The IAF’s emergency procurement of R-27 air-to-air missiles for its SU-30MKI fighters during the Balakot strike is a reminder of defense cooperation.
India’s Role As A Potential Mediator?
There has been a hypothesis that India, with its influence over Russia and Ukraine, can play a pivotal role in mediating peace. However, India has been reluctant because of the complexities involved and the two sides’ lack of indication of a quest for peace.
While Mr Modi has stated that a peaceful resolution through dialogue and diplomacy with a “human-centric” approach is needed, he has avoided stating any concrete steps closer to mediation.
Ukraine has made it clear that it’s going to no longer negotiate until Russian troops depart its territory, at the same time as Russia has declared several Ukrainian areas as a part of its territory and is not going to give them back. This stalemate means that any mediation effort is unlikely to be successful in the near period.
The Western Perspective
From the perspective of Western nations, Modi’s visit to Kyiv could be more symbolic. It indicates that India is inclined to interact with Ukraine and, by extension, the West while simultaneously maintaining its ties with Russia. This balancing act could assist India in avoiding the global isolation and sanctions that countries face due to their proximity to Russia.
However, some Western analysts view Modi’s visit as a way to placate the West instead of a real effort to help Ukraine. They argue that the visit is more about reasserting India’s strategic autonomy and meant to advance Indian pursuits by reinforcing its friendship with Kyiv while expressing its concerns about the ongoing war.
The Domestic Angle
Domestically, Modi’s visit to Kyiv is likely to be viewed as furthering India’s strategic interests and projecting a global image. The Ukraine visit displays to the Indian public that he’s preserving India’s strategic autonomy and not succumbing to external pressures.
The visit, moreover, comes at a time when India is trying to reduce its dependencies and diversify its needs. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India’s imports of Russian weapons have declined in recent years, and New Delhi is increasingly turning to diversification by engaging with the US, France, and Israel.
This diversification is part of India’s broader strategy to reduce its dependence on any single nation or entity and enhance its strategic autonomy.
Looking Ahead
The key question remains—what has Modi’s visit achieved? The visit’s number one deliverable may be the visit itself, as it demonstrates India’s willingness to interact with all parties in the conflict. However, it is unlikely to result in any dramatic change in the relationship with Russia or Ukraine or impact the war.
One area of future cooperation might be inside the reconstruction of Ukraine, which has been devastated by the conflict. India has the Afghanistan experience. India’s humanitarian assistance to Ukraine throughout the battle has been restrained.
As a symbolic gesture, Modi presented the BHISHM Cube, a revolutionary mobile hospital. However, Indian funding in Ukraine would, in all likelihood, want peace to be restored first.
For Russia, the visit is a reminder that India’s foreign is driven via its countrywide pursuits and that New Delhi is not inclined to be drawn into someone’s camp. Russia will need to understand the contradictions of India’s ties with the US and Ukraine as much as India understands Russia’s bonhomie with China and North Korea.
For Ukraine and the West, the visit is a sign that India is willing to interact with them and be a future peacemaker as it maintains its ties with Russia. Finally, India’s interests in Europe, the US, Russia, and Ukraine are independent, and furtherance of its national interest is foremost.
- Lieutenant General Ashok Bhim Shivane is the former Director General of Mechanised Forces and Strike Corps Commander of the Indian Army. He was awarded by President of India, PVSM (2017), AVSM (2016), & VSM (2009) and was nominated Honorary Aide-de-Camp to President of India in July 2017.
- VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR
