Taiwan’s coast guard suspects a Chinese-owned freighter of severing a critical undersea telecom cable off the island’s northern coast. The incident mirrors security challenges faced by Baltic nations over the past year, highlighting vulnerabilities in global underwater infrastructure.
On January 3, at approximately 12:40 PM, Taiwan’s Chunghwa Telecom informed the Coast Guard Administration (CGA) that a subsea communications cable near Keelung had been severed.
The CGA deployed a patrol vessel to intercept the Hong Kong-owned freighter Shunxin-39 (also known as Xing Shun 39, IMO 8358427), which was near Yehliu at the time.
Although coastguard officials managed to establish radio contact with the ship’s captain and conduct an external inspection, they were unable to board the vessel due to rough seas.
Furthermore, international law prohibited the ship’s seizure for further investigation as too much time had elapsed since the incident.
Tracking data from the ship’s automatic identification system (AIS) and satellite sources indicated that the Shunxin-39 had dragged its anchor in the location where the cable was damaged.
Analysts from MarineTraffic, a maritime analytics provider, revealed that the freighter had been crisscrossing waters near Taiwan’s northern coast since December 1. This irregular movement pattern prompted Taiwanese officials to suspect that the cable rupture was not merely an “innocent accident.”
Furthermore, Retired US Air Force Colonel Ray Powell highlighted that the ship responsible for damaging Taiwan’s submarine cable appears to have operated under at least two names (Shunxing39 and Xingshun39), flown two flags (Cameroon and Tanzania), and used six different Maritime Mobile Service Identities (MMSI) while traveling between Taiwan’s Keelung and South Korea’s Busan over the past six months.
Ownership records indicate that while the ship is registered in Cameroon, it belongs to Jie Yang Trading Limited, a Hong Kong-based company headed by Guo Wenjie, a Chinese national.
The vessel’s current location remains unclear as commercial services have not detected its AIS signal since Jan 3. The CGA has handed all gathered evidence to prosecutors conducting a criminal investigation into the matter.
In response to the incident, Taiwan has requested assistance from South Korean authorities. The suspected vessel is reportedly headed to Busan, South Korea, and is expected to arrive soon.
“Since it was not possible for us to question the captain, we have asked the South Korean authorities to help with the investigation at the ship’s next port of destination,” a Taiwan Coast Guard official said.
Despite the damage, Chunghwa Telecom, part of an international consortium that operates the US$500 million Trans-Pacific Express cable, successfully rerouted traffic to other cables, ensuring uninterrupted service. The cable, operational since 2008, links East Asia to the United States’ West Coast.
Baltic Model Looming Over Taiwan?
The event in Taiwan mirrors a series of comparable disruptions to undersea infrastructure across the globe, especially in the Baltic Sea, where vital cables and pipelines have suffered damage.
In October 2023, China was first implicated in undersea cable sabotage when its vessel, the New Polar Bear, damaged the 77-kilometer Balticconnector pipeline, a crucial energy source for Finland. This was accompanied by damage to an undersea data cable connecting Estonia to Sweden.
Following the event, the New Polar Bear sailed to St. Petersburg and was later photographed in the Arkhangelsk region of Russia, eventually docking in Tianjin, China.
Initially, China dismissed European accusations that the New Polar Bear was responsible. However, in August 2024, Beijing acknowledged that the Hong Kong-flagged ship had indeed caused the damage, attributing the incident to a severe storm.
In November 2024, two fiber-optic cables in the Baltic Sea were severed, with investigations focusing on the Chinese bulk carrier Yi Peng 3.
At the time, Germany’s Defense Minister Boris Pistorius echoed the view of many observers, labeling the incidents as “sabotage” and “hybrid aggression.”
He pointed out that it was almost impossible for a ship to accidentally sever multiple cables meticulously mapped on navigational charts.
A month later, in December 2024, Finland launched a sabotage investigation following the damage to the Estlink 2 power cable and four telecom lines. Finnish authorities suspect that the Eagle S, a tanker connected to Russia’s “shadow fleet,” caused the damage by dragging its anchor along the sea floor.
Taiwan, too, has been a frequent target of similar incidents. Over recent years, the island nation has faced numerous attacks on its underwater telecom cables, often without being able to determine the perpetrators.
Taiwan has even contacted the European Union for assistance, yet the source of the attacks remains unidentified.
The mounting frequency of these incidents has raised serious concerns over maritime security and even prompted NATO to increase its presence in the Baltic region.
What Are China’s & Russia’s Motives?
Undersea cables play a vital role in global communications and energy transmission. They form the backbone of the internet and support the flow of electricity between countries and continents.
However, these critical infrastructures are increasingly vulnerable to disruption. Attacks on undersea cables are not only disruptive, they have the potential to cripple economies and destabilize societies.
Each year, subsea cables are unintentionally cut dozens of times globally. The main causes of these incidents include anchor dragging and trawling in areas where cables cross. These activities, often carried out in busy shipping routes, can damage the cables when anchors or fishing trawls come into contact with them.
Another dangerous form of damage occurs when ships drag anchors along the seabed with power, which can put significant strain on the anchor, sometimes causing it to break or twist. As a result, a ship can unintentionally sever multiple cables or pipelines in one journey.
However, evidence from ongoing investigations into recent incidents suggests that some of these accidents are not entirely random. Ships involved in such disruptions sometimes continue their journey, leaving a trail of damage in their wake. These patterns point to the possibility of deliberate actions, possibly aimed at testing vulnerabilities in undersea infrastructure.
Russia has long been a suspected actor in threats to undersea cables. In recent years, Moscow has been linked to monitoring or tampering with cables, particularly in the Arctic and Baltic Seas.
In an analysis, Jakub Janda, director of the European Values Centre for Security Policy, and James Corera, director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Cyber, Technology and Security Program, said, “China’s involvement in the recent episodes need not have been direct; it could have been through providing logistics, technology or intelligence.”
They argued that Russia’s actions targeting Baltic undersea infrastructure are likely designed to create divisions and uncertainty within Europe, especially regarding the cohesion of NATO and the European Union.
This strategy would benefit China as well, they stated. In addition, these incidents serve as testing grounds, allowing Russia and China to assess Europe’s ability to respond to such attacks and gauge its overall resilience.
Russia and China can amplify their respective geopolitical strategies by coordinating these attacks while maintaining plausible deniability. The actions of both nations underscore a growing trend of using unconventional tactics to challenge the West.
A major challenge in addressing these threats is the right of a ship’s flag country to refuse cooperation with investigations. This legal loophole has allowed countries like China to avoid accountability in relation to such incidents.
In response to the increasing risks to undersea cables and energy infrastructure, NATO launched a dedicated center in May 2024 to enhance the protection of these critical assets.
However, despite the creation of this center, NATO’s efforts have so far proved ineffective. The recent incidents have revealed the center’s inability to prevent or respond to such attacks decisively.
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