Forty-nine years ago, in November 1975, an audacious mutiny unfolded on the Soviet frigate Storozhevoy, a Krivak-class destroyer stationed in Riga. A group of sailors seized the frigate to protest against the corruption and privilege of the Soviet ruling elite.
The mutiny, led by the ship’s political officer, Captain Valery Sablin, was an attempt at what he perceived as an important step to revive Leninist ideals and challenge the stagnation and ideological decay under Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev’s leadership.
This act of defiance ultimately failed but inspired Tom Clancy’s famous novel ‘The Hunt for Red October,’ forever etching Sablin’s story into the annals of Cold War history.
The chain of events began on November 7, 1975, as the Soviet Union celebrated the 58th anniversary of the October Revolution.
The Storozhevoy, a Krivak-class anti-submarine destroyer from the Baltic Fleet, was moored on the Daugava River. Around half of its 250-men crew was granted shore leave on this festive day.
But Sablin, the ship’s Zampolit (political officer), had more radical intentions than simply celebrating. An idealistic and charismatic leader, Sablin harbored deep dissatisfaction with then Brezhnev’s government.
Sablin’s discontent stemmed from his vision of true Leninist values—justice, equality, and transparency—which he felt were being betrayed by an elite Soviet bureaucracy more concerned with power and privilege than the welfare of the people.
Sablin aimed to sail the Storozhevoy to Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), hoping to broadcast his call for reform from the historic Kronstadt Island, a site of past revolutionary mutinies.
The Mutiny Unfolds
On the evening of November 8, 1975, Sablin told Captain Anatoly Potulny, the commander of the Storozhevoy, that several of the ship’s officers were drunk in the forward sonar compartment.
When Potulny went below deck to investigate, Sablin unexpectedly locked him in the compartment. “Sorry, I could not do otherwise,” Sablin said as Potulny banged on the hatch.
Sablin, a man of exceptional idealism, had long been critical of the Soviet bureaucracy’s privilege and the corruption that permeated the system. He believed that the time had come for a new Leninist revolution to restore the ideals of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.
Sablin’s call for revolution was met with mixed reactions from the ship’s officers. A vote was taken using black-and-white checker pieces, and the result was a tie. However, most of the crew sided with Sablin, locking the dissenting officers in their cabins. The mutiny was underway.
Around 0200 hours midnight on November 8, the Storozhevoy quietly departed from its dock in Riga, initiating a journey across the Riga Gulf.
The ship’s course was set towards the Irben Channel, located at the mouth of the Gulf, between the Osel and Courland Peninsulas. While the exact number of crew members loyal to Sablin and the conspirators may never be known, it’s clear that the operation required more manpower than one might expect.
Though powered by gas turbines, the Krivak-class destroyer was less automated than later American models like the Spruance class, meaning more personnel were needed to operate the engine room, the bridge, and various other spaces on board.
It can be speculated that Sablin, along with a few known supporters like Officer Markov and about a dozen loyal petty officers, persuaded the remaining crew—mostly young conscripts aged 18 and 19—to man their stations.
Despite the lack of experience among many of the crew, the mutineers managed to sail the Storozhevoy with its lights off and at a speed of 30 knots, just shy of the ship’s maximum capability, carefully avoiding other vessels in the Gulf.
The ship’s name, Storozhevoy, meaning “watchful” or “on guard,” seemed fitting as they moved through the waters under the cover of darkness.
The First Alarm And Soviet Response
The exact circumstances that alerted the Baltic authorities to the mutiny remain unclear. Adhering to standard procedures, the harbormaster reported the Storozhevoy’s departure within about 31 minutes.
However, according to some accounts, a conscript, who was not part of Sablin’s loyal group, leaped overboard before the ship reached the Gulf of Riga. After clinging to a buoy and swimming to shore, the cold and exhausted sailor tried to alert the authorities.
With public transport suspended due to the holiday, the sailor finally managed to reach a public phone, where he contacted the duty officer at Bolderia Naval Base, insisting he had urgent information but could not disclose it over the phone.
The officer, skeptical of his claim, refused to send a car. The sailor then walked to the Naval Headquarters, giving Storozhevoy over two hours’ head start.
Finally, at the Riga Naval Headquarters, initial attempts to establish communication with the ship were met with silence. Despite this, Rear Admiral I.I. Verenkin, the commander of the Riga Naval area, did not immediately take decisive action.
The situation only became clear when an emergency frequency message, “Mutiny onboard the Storozhevoy—we are heading for the open sea,” was received.
This message, which sparked chaos at Naval Headquarters, was likely sent by an officer who had managed to escape and access a radio undetected. However, it’s possible a conspirator who had changed their mind sent it. The transmission was uncoded and intercepted in clear Russian by the Swedish Armed Forces.
The Soviet Baltic Fleet, initially unaware of the full scale of the situation, feared the Storozhevoy was defecting to a Scandinavian nation.
This fear stemmed from a similar incident in 1961 when Lithuanian Captain Jonas Plaskus surrendered his submarine tender at Gotland Island. This earlier incident also inspired Tom Clancy’s renowned novel The Hunt for Red October.
But the Storozhevoy was far more significant than any previous defection. It was an advanced Burevestnik-class frigate (NATO codename Krivak I), only 18 months old, and a vital asset to the Soviet Navy.
Equipped with sophisticated systems for hunting U.S. submarines, including the RBU-6000 rockets and the SS-N-14 Metel (“Snowstorm”) missiles, the loss of such a vessel to the West would be a catastrophic blow.
In a last-ditch effort to prevent the ship’s defection, a Vice Admiral urgently contacted Sablin, begging him to return and promising clemency.
However, it wasn’t until Premier Brezhnev was awakened at 4:00 AM with the grim news that the Soviet leadership made its fateful decision—authorize the use of lethal force to prevent the embarrassment of losing such a crucial asset to the enemy.
The Soviet Union mobilized half of its Baltic Fleet and dispatched 60 aircraft to track down and reclaim the Storozhevoy.
The Pursuit And Capture Of The Storozhevoy
In response to the Storozhevoy’s defection, eleven fast attack boats were deployed from Riga and Liepaja, Latvia, in pursuit of the rogue frigate.
Soviet Navy Il-38 patrol aircraft and Tu-16 Badger bombers were soon joined by Yak-28 ‘Brewer’ jets from the Soviet Air Force’s 668th Bomber Regiment. These aircraft, equipped with glass noses for targeting unguided bombs, scoured the skies and seas in an attempt to locate the missing vessel.
However, visibility was poor, and the Storozhevoy, operating silently, remained elusive in the vast expanse of the Gulf of Riga. At 6:00 AM, dense fog enveloped the frigate, prompting Captain Sablin to activate the ship’s radar to avoid collisions with commercial vessels.
As the Storozhevoy approached the Irbe Strait, a lighthouse spotted her, and Yak-28 jets were redirected to the area. In a mistaken identification, they dropped bombs on a Soviet freighter bound for Finland, thinking it was the mutinying ship.
By 8:00 AM, Tu-16 bombers had homed in on the radar emissions from the Storozhevoy. Armed with radar-guided KSR-5 ‘Kingfish’ cruise missiles, the bombers locked onto the first target. However, as the frigate entered international waters, the pilots hesitated, unwilling to risk striking a neutral vessel or firing on fellow Soviets.
Meanwhile, Swedish radar operators monitored the escalating Soviet air and naval activity and intercepted their communications.
The Soviet military scrambled all thirty-six Yak-28s from the 668th Bomber Regiment, though a near collision on the runway delayed their deployment. Meanwhile, two missile boats under Captain Bobrikov closed within range of their P-15 Termit anti-ship missiles. But it was the Yak-28s that struck first.
One of the jets strafed the Storozhevoy with cannon fire, hitting the port side. Despite the frigate’s defenses, including two rapid-fire three-inch guns and SA-N-4 Osa anti-aircraft missiles, the Storozhevoy did not return fire, possibly due to lack of ammunition or orders from Sablin to avoid engagement.
The jets made repeated bombing runs, causing near misses and forcing water to erupt from the frigate’s hull. However, one bomb, a FAB-250, struck the ship’s stern, damaging the rear deck and jamming the steering mechanism. The Storozhevoy began circling, eventually coming to a halt just fifty nautical miles from Swedish waters.
In the chaos, three crew members freed Captain Putolny from the sonar compartment. Armed with a pistol, he stormed the bridge and shot Sablin in the leg. At 10:32 AM, he sent a desperate message: “The ship is stopped. I have taken control.”
The Yak-28s aborted their attack runs, though one group mistakenly targeted Soviet pursuit vessels, prompting retaliatory fire that caused no damage. Soon after, the Naval Infantry boarded the Storozhevoy and arrested the crew.
Meanwhile, Moscow quickly covered up the incident by staging naval exercises the following day. The number of casualties on the Storozhevoy varies widely in reports. However, one crew member later claimed that superiors informed him the total number of killed and wounded on the ship was “less than fifteen.”
The bomber pilots were reprimanded for the friendly fire and confusion, while the Storozhevoy’s crew faced months of detention.
Ultimately, only a few officers were tried, with Lt. Shein sentenced to eight years in prison, and Sablin convicted of treason and executed on August 3, 1976, and laid to rest in an unmarked grave. In 1994, he was posthumously re-sentenced to ten years for disobeying orders.
Decades later, the U.S. historian Gregory Young compiled accounts of the mutiny into a thesis later read by an insurance salesman, Tom Clancy. Inspired by Sablin’s failed mission and the story of another Soviet defector, Jonas Plaskus, Clancy wrote ‘The Hunt for Red October.’
Unlike the novel’s disillusioned submarine captain, Marko Ramius, Sablin’s motivations were driven by a passionate, albeit misguided, attempt to reform the Soviet system he once believed in.
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