The Africa Corps emerged as a direct descendant of Wagner, but with crucial differences. Unlike its predecessor, this new organization operates with direct lines of control to Russia’s military intelligence (GRU) and the Ministry of Defense. It’s not just a mercenary group—it’s a state-sanctioned instrument of geopolitical strategy.
Despite its growing role, the Africa Corps is struggling to replenish its ranks. In recent weeks, recruitment efforts have surged, including multiple promotional videos and the opening of new recruitment offices across Russia.
According to Stop Wagner, a humanitarian organization focused on countering Wagner Group activities and exposing their crimes, the group has opened new recruitment offices across several Russian regions to expand its efforts.
A Struggle For Recruits
In February, the Africa Corps released a new recruitment video. New recruits are offered substantial bonus payments, with incentives varying by region. In Nizhny Novgorod, for instance, a contract signing comes with a 1,000-square-meter land grant.
A video filmed in Tatarstan last week provides details on how to enlist. Besides Moscow and Saint Petersburg, new recruitment centers have been established in Kazan, Naberezhnye Chelny, Nizhny Novgorod, and Krasnodar.
The Africa Corps is primarily targeting individuals with prior military experience, including former officers, contract soldiers, and veterans of special forces or Wagner units.

According to Stop Wagner, the Africa Corps’ ongoing recruitment drive highlights its struggle to attract new fighters. Like the Russian Army and other PMCs, it faces a persistent manpower shortage that is unlikely to be resolved soon.
However, beyond recruitment, the Africa Corps is strategically embedding itself in regions grappling with security crises—most notably in the Sahel—where instability creates opportunities for external influence.
The Africa Corp – Russia’s Mercenary Force
For years, Russia maintained the official line that private military companies (PMCs) did not exist within its borders, dismissing reports of such groups as Western propaganda. This argument, frequently applied to the Wagner Group between 2011 and 2021, allowed the Kremlin to maintain plausible deniability over the group’s activities.
The first crack in this façade appeared in September 2021, when Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov publicly acknowledged a Russian PMC operating in Mali. A year later, in September 2022, oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin openly admitted that he was the founder of Wagner—an announcement that marked the group’s full emergence from the shadows.
By then, Wagner had already evolved into a key instrument of Russian foreign policy, particularly in Africa, and had played a critical role in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The group infamously recruited prison inmates for frontline combat, reflecting its deep integration into Russia’s military operations.
However, Prigozhin’s growing influence put him at odds with the Russian Ministry of Defense. In 2022, he launched a public tirade against Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, accusing them of sitting in ‘expensive clubs’ thinking they were ‘masters of life,’ while soldiers bore the brunt of the war.
But his actions extended beyond mere criticism—he was maneuvering for a larger role in Russia’s informal power structure.
The simmering conflict erupted in June 2023 when Prigozhin ordered Wagner forces to march toward Moscow in what he called a “march of justice.” The rebellion was abruptly halted about 200 kilometers from the capital, with Prigozhin claiming he wanted to avoid Russian bloodshed. Yet the fallout was swift.
Two months later, on August 23, 2023, his private jet crashed, killing him and six senior Wagner members—marking both the literal and figurative collapse of Wagner’s dominance in Russian foreign policy.
In the aftermath, the Kremlin swiftly moved to reassert control over PMCs. Wagner’s African operations were absorbed into the state-backed Africa Corps, which retained many of Wagner’s former commanders and fighters. With this transition, Moscow sought to preserve Wagner’s diplomatic and military influence in Africa while ensuring that no private military leader could challenge state authority again.
The rise and fall of the Wagner Group illustrate the Kremlin’s evolving approach to PMCs—once shadowy, then indispensable, and now fully re-nationalized under state control.
The Africa Corps stands as the latest iteration of Russia’s mercenary force, serving its geopolitical ambitions while preventing another Wagner-like challenge to state power.
According to the Danish Institute for International Studies, the Africa Corps has even stronger ties to the Russian state than the Wagner Group. Unlike its predecessor, the Africa Corps reportedly operates under a direct chain of command leading to the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency, and ultimately to the Deputy Minister of Defense.
The group’s expanding presence in Africa has been well-documented. Footage captured the arrival of Africa Corps personnel in Burkina Faso (January 2024) and Niger (April 2024). A video shared on the Corps’ Telegram channel showcased their deployment in Niger, accompanied by the bold declaration: “We. Are. There.” (Мы. Там. Есть.; My. Tam. Yest.).
According to The Africa Report, Russia’s military and the Africa Corps have been expanding their footprint further south, deploying troops from Syria to Libya and reinforcing their presence in southern Libya and Chad.
Russia’s Expanding Grip On Africa
Experts believe the Africa Corps will continue to be Moscow’s most strategic tool in Africa. By capitalizing on worsening security in the Sahel, Russia is strengthening its political and economic foothold while countering Western influence.
Since 2015, Russia has signed military cooperation agreements with at least 43 African nations, according to the European Parliament. This growing alliance was evident in UN votes on Ukraine, where many African countries either abstained from condemning Russia’s invasion or openly supported it.
Beyond military ties, Russia is also seeking economic leverage through access to Africa’s vast natural resources. However, it faces stiff competition. China, the United States, European nations, Turkey, and the UAE are all vying for a greater share of Africa’s strategic wealth.
As the Africa Corps embeds itself deeper into conflict zones, its success—or failure—will determine the next phase of Russia’s power projection on the continent.
- Shubhangi Palve is a defense and aerospace journalist. Before joining the EurAsian Times, she worked for ET Prime. She has over 15 years of extensive experience in the media industry, spanning print, electronic, and online domains.
- Contact the author at shubhapalve (at) gmail.com