The United States routinely flies cutting-edge fighter jets and bombers near the Korean Peninsula to deter the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea. However, 69 years ago, a U.S. spy plane, which was on a seemingly innocuous reconnaissance sortie, was shot down by a North Korean MiG-21.
The tensions between the two Koreas and between the U.S. and North Korea have been escalating in recent times—the cause: North Korea’s expansion of its nuclear and missile program. The U.S. wants to eliminate Pyongyang’s nuclear program, whereas the North Korean leadership has vowed to thwart such efforts.
Amid a rapid expansion in North Korea’s military capabilities, the U.S. and South Korean militaries have strengthened their cooperation. The two sides frequently conduct military drills in an attempt to project power and deter North Korea.
For instance, a joint aerial drill recently took place over the Korean Peninsula, involving US B-1B stealth strategic bombers and F-16 fighter jets, as well as South Korean F-35 and F-16 fighter jets.
The North Korean leadership considers the joint military exercises between the U.S. and South Korea as provocative, alleging that it is preparation for an invasion of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Notably, North Korea frequently retaliates to these joint drills with missile tests, which in turn, pave the way for greater military collaboration and more frequent drills, enforcing the same pattern that keeps fuelling tensions.
This rivalry goes back decades to the initial years of the Cold War, when the North’s leadership, supported and trained by the Soviets, launched an invasion of South Korea in the 1950s, which was backed by the U.S. The war lasted three years, ending only in an armistice, rather than a peace treaty, in 1953.
However, peace remained elusive between the two Koreas, as well as between the North Korean and U.S. governments. The DPRK owed complete allegiance to the former Soviet Union and its ally China, which kept the U.S. apprehensive long after the Korean War had ended.
There were sporadic engagements between the North and South that continued along the DMZ even after the 1953 armistice, and eventually, the North became bold enough to fire on American soldiers.
For instance, in 1968, DPRK’s forces captured the USS Pueblo, and its 83 crew members were detained during an intelligence gathering mission in the East Sea. The crew of the ship was let off as a result of diplomatic efforts by the U.S., but the ship has remained moored in North Korea ever since.
A year later, on April 15, 1969, another engagement occurred—bigger and more unprecedented than the shocking seizure of the USS Pueblo. This involved a North Korean MiG-21 fighter jet, acquired from the USSR, and a US EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft.
Revisiting The US EC-121 Downing
The U.S. established Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron 1 in 1960 at the Naval Air Station (NAS) in Atsugi, Japan. The EC-121M reconnaissance aircraft stationed in Atsugi was tasked with conducting surveillance sorties to monitor China, North Korea, and the USSR.
The U.S. Navy’s reconnaissance missions, codenamed ‘Beggar Shadow,’ tracked several facets of the North’s communications and air defense systems. Special attention was paid to the military and intelligence services in the far northeastern region of North Korea, which borders China and the Soviet Union.
The EC-121M was equipped with antennae on the underside to gather communications signals and a sizable radome on top to gather target radar signals. Although it wasn’t a major concern at the time, the possibility of hostile fighters intercepting the planes was always present.
The aircraft became vulnerable and the mission risk increased when the electronics equipment was added, as the EC-121M’s top speed was reduced to approximately 220 knots due to the additional weight and drag. Additionally, unlike previous aircraft used for intelligence missions, the EC-121M was unarmed and lacked defensive electronic countermeasures (DECM) capability, making it an easy target.
On April 11, 1969, Admiral John McCain Sr., commander in chief of the Pacific Command (CINCPAC), received a communication from General Charles Bonesteel III, commander of American forces in Korea, regarding the escalating tensions with the North.
Bonesteel said that North Koreans had been especially angry at UN soldiers’ “provocative actions” during military armistice commission meetings. He advised aircrews to be especially alert and prepared.
On April 15, an EC-121M call sign “Deep Sea 129,” took off from Naval Air Station Atsugi, Japan at 0700 local for a “Beggar Shadow” electronic reconnaissance mission off the east coast of North Korea, with orders to approach no closer than 50 nautical miles, and with the intent to recover at Osan Air Base, South Korea, as per official UU.S.Navy history.
The aircraft was flying with eight officers and 23 enlisted personnel. According to reports from the time, the anticipated duration of the flight was 8.5 hours, which included two and a half laps around a “racetrack loop” that was practically parallel to the North Korean coast. However, the aircrew had no idea what was coming their way.
At about 1330 local time, two North Korean MiG-21s that had been sent to Hoemun took off for an unknown flight. The DPRK acquired these cutting-edge fighters from the Soviet Union in 1963 to modernize its air force.
The place and time of the MiG-21’s launch indicated that the event was pre-planned, as the MiG-21 had the shortest route to intercept the course of Deep Sea 129, which the North Koreans were by then fully familiar with.
U.S. signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets on the ground detected initial reflections of the launch at 1335 local time.
“One of the MiGs set up an overwater defensive patrol (DEFPAT) approaching no closer than 65 nautical miles to Deep Sea 129, while the other MiG continued directly toward Deep Sea 129 and, at 1338 (0438Z), was noted within 50 nautical miles of the EC-121 and closing fast. “The warning was issued by U.S. SIGINT sites, but it is unknown if Deep Sea 129 received it,” states the U.S. Navy.
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“Standard procedure for an EC-121 under threat was to dive toward the deck, so when Deep Sea 121 disappeared from radar at 1251 (0451Z), it did not necessarily mean it had been shot down, so there was a significant period of uncertainty amongst radar and SIGINT sites in South Korea and Japan about what happened. There was no message from Deep Sea 129 indicating it was under attack.”
At 1345, the USAF commanding general at Osan Air Base directed the launch of two F-102 fighters to take a combat air patrol (CAP) station 140 nautical miles off the South Korean coast along Deep Sea 129’s planned track, approximately 100 nautical miles south of the incident location.
However, the two planes took some time to assist Deep Sea 129 in case it needed help and took off only at 1404 (0504Z). By now, it was too late.
At 1400 (0500Z), the Naval Security Group (NSG) personnel supporting these missions at the Kamiseya base in Japan made a normal hourly comms check, except this time, Deep Sea 129 did not answer.
“Concern over Deep Sea 129 began to mount when, about ten minutes after disappearing from radar, Deep Sea 129 neither re-emerged nor communicated. Even so, it was not until 1444 (0544) that a U.S. SIGINT site issued a CRITIC message (essentially a flash override message in NSA comms channels) to NSA indicating the aircraft might have been shot down,” writes the U.S. Navy.
A few minutes later, North Korea declared that a U.S. aircraft had been shot down (with a “single shot”) at 1350 (0450Z) following an incursion deep into North Korean airspace. North Korea praised the attack as a “brilliant achievement” and threatened to exact “hundredfold revenge” in response.
“Over the next few days, search and rescue operations discovered floating debris and the bodies of two crew members near the reported shoot-down location. The search was finally called off on the nineteenth,” according to the U.S government.
The incident triggered a very fierce response in the United States, and officials mulled a military attack on North Korea as vengeance.
After much consideration, Nixon decided that the United States would not be intimidated and sent TF-71 into the Sea of Japan as a tremendous display of military force. Within a week, he would restart intelligence collection flights against North Korea. When Nixon finally spoke to the American people on April 18, he disclosed specific intelligence data and promised North Korea would “never get away with it again.”
While the U.S Navy troops that entered the Sea of Japan made extensive preparations to use aircraft and/or surface-to-air missiles to gain air superiority over North Korea, bomb important sites, or start a blockade (or any combination of these), it all came to nothing.
Although Soviet naval units shadowed the U.S ships, the North Korean military did not respond. The TF-71 units eventually started to leave by April 26th, mostly to resume combat operations off Vietnam, where a war was raging.
“The tragedy of Deep Sea 129 did lead to significant improvements in how Navy PARPRO missions were approved, tasked, briefed, and supported. Although there were numerous intercepts of U.U.S.avy intelligence collection flights since the shootdown of Deep Sea 129, none were fired on or lost until 1 April 2001, when a Peoples Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANF) J-8 Finback II fighter collided with an EP-3E Aries II of VQ-1 in mid-air after conducting dangerous maneuvers off Hainan Island, China.”
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