If anything, the inclusion of as many as five Turkish firms in this year’s list of 100 defense companies of the world highlights Turkey’s impressive rise as a major arms producer.
Ukraine’s F-16 Fighters May Get AGM-158 JASSMs That Could Turn The Tables On Russian Jets – US Media
But what is more significant is that the rapid development of Turkey’s defense industries and the increasing global acceptance of their products have resulted in many collateral benefits, such as the consolidation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s regime without any fear of a military challenge, Ankara pursuing a militarized foreign policy in its neighborhood, and the country managing flexible geopolitical alliances.
The August issue of “Defense News” magazine has listed 100 top defense companies of the world, and in this listed five (up from last year’s four) Turkish companies are:
- ASELSAN (42, up from 47 last year): producer of defense electronics, especially communications and sensors.
- Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI or TUSAS) (50, up from 58): leader in Turkish defense aerospace
- ROKETSAN (71, up from 80): The producer of unguided rockets and guided missiles has seen revenues grow largely due to the integration of its products into Turkish unmanned systems.
- Machine and Chemical Industry (MKE) (84, new): producer of small arms, artillery and ammunition
- Military Factory and Shipyard Enterprise (AFSAT) (94, new): aircraft, naval, and land systems production and overhaul.
Interestingly, the most dynamic and much talked about sector in the Turkish defense industry—unmanned systems—has yet to produce “a Top 100 firm,” but the way TB2 Bayraktar and Akinci Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles are moving forward and in great demand across various global hotspots, it is a matter of time before they figure in the exalted list.
Turkey now exports arms from Chile in South America to Indonesia in Asia. It supplies systems to countries in Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East, as well as within NATO. By transferring its technology, Turkey also favors joint production in other countries. Examples in this category are Kazakhstan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, the UAE, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Indonesia.
Reportedly, Turkish manufacturers succeed in providing training, going above and beyond their competitors. They ensure that their company personnel are stationed in importing countries for a year or even longer, guaranteeing comprehensive support. This level of commitment and dedication has earned the trust and loyalty of countries, particularly in the Arab world, where Turkish arms are now in the biggest demand.
Not long ago, Turkey was the third biggest receiver of arms in the world. But since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, Turkey’s indigenous defense industry has progressed at an impressive rate, making the country the 12th biggest arms exporter, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) figures.
It has significantly decreased its dependence on foreign military imports from around 80 percent in 2004 to about less than 20 percent now.
Engagement in defense collaborations offers Turkey several strategic benefits. It has boosted Turkey’s regional clout, cementing its role as a pivotal actor in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) landscape. As an important source of arms, possible because of effective domestic defense industries, Turkey has managed to conclude many bilateral agreements in its proactive foreign policy maneuvers in this part of the world.
For instance, it signed a defense agreement with Libya in 2020, which generated such confidence in Tripoli that it led to the subsequent signing of a hydrocarbon reserves agreement in 2022.
Similarly, Turkey’s solid support for Azerbaijan, a perennial priority in its foreign policy agenda, during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War depended to a great extent on the supply and deployment of Turkish defense industry products, notably the Bayraktar TB2. With Azerbaijan’s resultant victory over forces from Armenia, Turkey’s regional profile strengthened the most.
Similar examples, like the Qatar crisis and the Syrian war, have enhanced Turkey’s regional standing as a crucial contributor to regional stability, fostering avenues for more partnerships across different domains. This was essentially due to Turkish defense exports.
Following the 2021 al-Ula agreement, which ended the 2017 Gulf crisis and blockade against Qatar, relations among Ankara, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh improved significantly.
Turkey’s rise as a defense manufacturer seems to align perfectly with the strategic objectives of the leading Gulf countries. Turkish defense products are not only highly efficient but also competitively priced, making them an attractive option for these countries, which were otherwise dependent on Western arms.
Today, Saudi Arabia is the biggest procurer of Turkish military equipment—more precisely, UCAVs. In what is said to be Turkey’s “biggest defense and aviation export contract” to date, Saudi Arabia has agreed to purchase over US$3 billion worth of Baykar’s next-generation UAV Akinci.
Between 2018 and 2022, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE were the top three clients of Ankara’s defense industry products, accounting for 20 percent, 17 percent, and 13 percent of Turkey’s total arms exports. Now, with Turkey prepared to manufacture weapons as a partner of these countries, there is an added advantage.
Turkey’s arms industry again played a role in normalizing relations between Turkey and Egypt. In a historic meeting between Presidents Erdoğan and Abdel Fattah El Sisi in Cairo in February 2024, Turkey and Egypt agreed to jointly pursue strategic-level relations. Relations that had been damaged after 2013 are now on course to be elevated to a comprehensive level.
But what is noteworthy here is that this summit between the two leaders was preceded by announcements on talks on a major sale of Baykar UAVs to Egypt. The latter looks set to become a production center for Baykar, boasting one of the largest militaries in the Arab world and favorable labor conditions for production.
The Turkish defense industry is also said to have provided Ankara with the strength to have an assertive foreign policy and take a different stand in the Russian-Ukraine war despite the country being a member of NATO. The sale of Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine while simultaneously maintaining open channels of communication with Moscow reflects Turkey’s nuanced strategic approach, which would not have been possible without advancements in its defense industry, it is said.
Growth in the Turkish defense industry has also played an important role in providing political stability in Turkey, whose political culture had historically relied on an acute sense of militarism since the inception of the Republic.
There are political analysts who argue that since Erdoğan’s ascent to power in 2001, his strong civilian rule, which, in turn, saw the military’s influence over politics wane, as a conscious policy of the government, has been due to many factors, prominent of which has been the success of the country’s home-grown defense industry.
Initially, Turkish defense firms were largely owned and operated by endowments established by the Turkish Armed Forces, such as HAVELSAN and ASELSAN. In the last decade, the breadth of companies operating in the sector has expanded exponentially, with the entry of private sector companies such as the famed UAV manufacturer Baykar Technologies, headed by Erdoğan’s son-in-law, chief technology officer Selçuk Bayraktar.
Baykar’s signature product, the TB2 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), has become synonymous with Ankara’s expanding security footprint and has evolved into a major export tool with a wide array of government clients. All this seems to have made the Turkish military elites happy and less inclined for political power.
There is now seemingly a remodeled partnership among politicians, the security bureaucracy, and the armed forces. Erdoğan’s political campaigns these days rely heavily on the success of the defense industry, which plays a large part in the governing coalition’s national discourse, it is said.
As pointed out once in the EurAsian Times, Erdoğan had not only depended for his election victory in May last year on the arms industry; he had also given enough indication of who would be his likely political successor. And that successor is widely believed to be his son-in-law Selçuk Bayraktar, the co-owner of the Turkish defense firm Baykar, the producer of TB2 Bayraktar drones.
Reality Check For Turkey
However, notwithstanding all the positive impacts that the Turkish Arms Industry has on the country’s polity, economy, defense, and foreign policy, there needs to be some reality- checks.
First, the Turkish arms industry is dependent on crucial hard and software imports, particularly semiconductors and microchips, which are procured from foreign technology companies.
Secondly, the Turkish military-industrial complex lacks a critical mass of domestic energy sources, which it is forced to import. That explains why it is in business with Russia, a great source of energy.
Thirdly, Turkey has a shortage of skilled human capital, largely due to issues in higher education. Reportedly, Turkey does not have enough students whose standards equal those of their counterparts in the West and Russia, particularly in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) subjects.
Fourthly, high-technology goods comprise a relatively low share of Turkish exports. Apparently, over half of the gross value generated in the Turkish defense industry comes from low—and medium-technology products.
Fifthly, a recent study points out that rising inflation in the country, which has led to monetary tightening, is a major challenge. Domestic bank loans have become less attractive for developing small firms into major defense industrial players.
With the above bottlenecks, Turkey’s defense industry still has a long way to go to match those of the U.S. or even Russia. But it has to be admitted that what it has achieved so far is impressive enough, given its expanding global footprint.
- Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board – EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, on strategic affairs for nearly three decades. A former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship, he is also a Professor at Reva University, Bangalore.
- VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR
- CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
- Follow EurAsian Times on Google News
